Marsh v. Municipal Court

WOOD, P. J. Petitioner, Larry Marsh, sought a writ in the superior court prohibiting the Municipal Court of the Citrus Judicial District from trying him upon a misdemeanor charge of violating section 148 of the Penal Code (resisting public officer in discharge of duty). The writ was sought upon [867]the alleged basis that petitioner had been denied his right to a speedy trial. He appeals from the order denying his petition for a writ of prohibition.

The petition alleged in substance, as follows: On September 2,1964, petitioner was arrested and taken into custody pursuant to a warrant issued by the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District. As a result of events occurring at petitioner’s residence at the time of the arrest, a misdemeanor complaint, charging him with violation of section 148 of the Penal Code, was filed on September 3, 1964. On September 18, 1964, he was taken before the Municipal Court of the Citrus Judicial District for arraignment where he, without counsel, pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial, and the trial was set for October 14, 1964, which was a date 42 days from the date of arrest. He did not waive his right to a speedy trial. On October 14, the petitioner made a motion in the Municipal Court of the Citrus Judicial District for counsel, which motion was granted; and at that time he refused to waive his right to a speedy trial. That court, upon its own motion, continued the ease to October 21, which was 49 days from the date of the arrest and 33 days from the date of arraignment. Counsel for petitioner (defendant therein) was appointed. On October 21, 1964, counsel for defendant made a motion for an order dismissing the proceedings on the ground that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial, which motion, based upon section 1382, subdivision 3, of the Penal Code, was denied. As a result of the denial of the motion, the said court is proceeding with said action in violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial as provided by the Constitution of California and said section 1382, subdivision 3, of the Penal Code. Petitioner has no plain, adequate and speedy remedy by appeal.

In the answer to the petition, it was alleged in substance, among other things, that the arrest first referred to in the petition was made pursuant to a warrant issued by the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District, and that the petitioner, at that time or at any time, was not arrested on the charge of violating section 148 of the Penal Code (resisting a public officer, which charge was filed in the Municipal Court of the Citrus Judicial District).