United California Bank v. Cranston
Before: Draper
DRAPER, P. J. The relationship of the heirs at law to the adoptive father of decedent entitled them to succeed to decedent’s estate: Our question is whether the same collateral adoptive relationship necessarily requires that they be treated, for inheritance tax purposes, as relatives.
Decedent came to California from the Azores early.in the present century to live with Mr. and Mrs. J ose P. Amaral, By the time of the 1951 amendment which permitted adoption of adults .(Civ. Code,. §227p), Mrs. Amaral had died, but decedent was' formally adopted by Mr. Amaral. He died in [813195]3, and Ms will left Ms estate to her. Decedent died in 1960. Her estate, wMeh she had received from her adoptive father, was devised in equal shares to a natural brother and two natural sisters in the Azores. One sister and the brother predeceased her, but left lineal descendants. On the prior appeal (Estate of Goulart, 222 Cal.App.2d 808 [35 Cal.Rptr. 465]), we held that the deceased brother and sister of decedent were not “kindred” within the meaning of the anti-lapse statute Probate Code, section 92, and that the devises to the predeceased siblings failed. Thus decedent died intestate as to two-thirds of her estate and, under the laws of succession, this share went to a sister of the adoptive father and to the descendants of his deceased brother and sister.
The order fixing inheritance tax classified the adoptive aunt- and cousins as Class D transferees, i.e., strangers (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13310). The adoptive relatives appeal, contending that their relationship to the adoptive father entitled them, as aunt and cousins of decedent, to be deemed Class C transferees (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13309), thus gaining added exemptions and lesser tax rates. (The natural sister who survived decedent'- and thus took under the will was held to be a Class B transferee [§13308].)
Appellants argue that by statute (Prob. Code, § 257) the adoptive family is substituted for the natural relatives “for all purposes.” But the section in fact provides that the adopted child shall be deemed a descendant of the adopting parent “for all purposes of succession.” The importance of the quoted qualification is emphasized in a recent decision (Estate of Zook, 62 Cal.2d 492 [42 Cal.Rptr. 597, 399 P.2d 53]), which establishes that our codes show no legislative intent to effect “total correlation between probate law and" taxation law. (P. 494.) While some degree of parallel interpretation is necessary, the social objectives served by the adoption statutes may warrant differing treatment in the two fields in the light of the circumstances of the particular case.
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