Kramer v. Superior Court

DRAPER, P. J. Petitioners are officers of the California Highway Patrol. They weighed trucks of real parties, in interest at an official weighing station and determined that each carried a load of logs in excess of the maximum permitted by law (Veh. Code, §§ 35551 et seq.). The truckers declined to reduce the loads to the legal maximum and the officers refused to permit them to return their vehicles to the state highway until the loads were reduced. The trucks remained in the parking area adjoining the weighing station for several days. Real parties filed an action against the patrolmen as individuals, seeking possession .of the vehicles and damages for conversion. They also resorted to the provisional remedy of claim and delivery (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 509, et seq.). Petitioners, of course, claimed neither title nor .right to possession of the vehicles, and they filed no undertaking. Accordingly, the sheriff seized the vehicles and 'returned them to real parties. The truckers pressed their claims Lor damages. Both sides sought summary judgment. The trial court granted real parties’ motion on the issue of "liability, but reserved the issue of damages for determination at a trial. Petitioners sought prohibition or mandate. We issued alternative writs.

A traffic officer may require weighing of a ‘vehicle (Veh. Code, § 2802). If he determines; that its weight is unlawful, “he may require the driver to stop in a suitable place [502]and . . . remove such portion of the load as may be necessary to . . . reduce it to the limits permitted under this code.” (Veh. Code, § 2803.)

The weight limits obviously are designed to protect the highways (22 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 152). Also apparent is the desire to protect other highway users from the hazard of vehicles which are less manageable by reason of overloading. Any thought that furtherance of these public interests is limited to issuance of a citation is dispelled by the quoted provision of section 2803. We would subvert the statutory scheme if we held that the driver of an overweight vehicle has the unqualified right to continue his unlawful use of the highway once he has received a citation. The fines fixed by section 42030 for violation of the weight limitations are not licenses for continuing violation of the law. For many years, department regulations have been clear that an overloaded vehicle shall not be allowed to proceed until the load is reduced, and this reasonable administrative construction of the statute is entitled to weight.

Real parties emphasize the reference of section 2803 to “a suitable place”. But their affidavits do not contradict petitioners’ declaration that for at least three years overloaded trucks, including those driven by real parties, had in fact reduced loads at this same point. Real parties’ true claim seems to be that equipment for unloading logs is not installed at the scales. Uncontradicted affidavits show that petitioners informed real parties of the availability of unloading equipment to be brought to this spot at small cost. Real parties assert only that they should be allowed to proceed to a sawmill where permanent loading equipment is maintained. To permit the law violator to continue his lawbreaking until he reaches a destination which seems to him fully adequate to correct his violation seems to pervert the true purpose of section 2803. The issue of suitability of location is more properly to be determined by the traffic officer than by the trucker who has violated the law. This view is sustained by the 1965 amendment to section 2803, which, although effective after the events here in issue, appears but to clarify the previous legislative intent. We find no impropriety in requiring one who embarks upon a trip in an overloaded truck to provide for himself the means of safely reducing his load when he is caught.