Sharp v. American Heart Ass'n
Before: Dyke
VAN DYKE, J.* This is an appeal by all the heirs at law of Emma M. Meininger, deceased, from a portion of a decree in a proceeding to determine heirship. The trial court construed decedent’s will and, having concluded that it contained an operative general residuary clause, decreed that appellants take nothing as heirs. The appeal presents no factual issues. No evidence was received. (See Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866 [44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839], for a recent statement of the rules of interpretation in such a case.)
The will contains 15 numbered articles. The first article directs payment of debts and requests a simple funeral and cremation. The second states that Amos Meininger is her husband and that the testatrix has no living issue of that or any previous marriage. The third states that she owns considerable separate property and states because of that it is her 11 express intention” that the following general disposition of her “property be made” in the event she predeceases her husband. She then states this “general testamentary plan” to be that all property in the name of Amos, all property in the names of both, and all joint tenancy property shall go to Amos; that all property in her name alone be placed in trust for the benefit of Amos during his life ‘1 except as hereinafter provided,” and that all property in her name and in that of any person other than Amos go to such person. Article fourth appoints Amos to act as executor and in the alternative, if Amos predeceases her, she appoints Milfred Gribble. By article fifth she gives to Amos all property not standing in her name alone and not standing in her name and in the name of some person other than Amos, and as to property standing in her name and in the name of another, such property to such person. She gives to a named trustee all property standing in her name alone, the income therefrom to be disbursed to Amos during his lifetime. (The corpus is not specifically disposed of in article fifth.) She then excepts from the trust and gives to Grover and Louise [104]Lorenz certain corporate stock shares and to Milfred and Meda Gribble her cut glass and hand-painted china. She also provides, “not specifically an exception, but a qualification to the above trust,” that Amos shall have the use and enjoyment of the family home with income and control during his life; but that if business conditions warrant his life estate “may be terminated and said property sold upon the life tenant . . . and the remaindermen. Milfred and Meda Gribble, or the survivor thereof, mutually agreeing to the terms and conditions of such sale. ’ ’ Article sixth is a formal and complete residuary clause, unconditional so far as its own terms be concerned, which gives the residue of her estate to respondents “National Cancer Fund, National Heart Fund and Shriner’s Hospital for Crippled Children, San Francisco.” Article seventh states: “In the event my said husband shall predecease me, or in the event my said husband and I shall perish in a common accident or collision, then . . . I give . . . the following . . . property” to Joseph and Frank Lorenz (brothers of decedent), each 16 shares of Lorenz Company stock; to Grover Lorenz (brother) and his wife, 19 shares of said company stock; to Meda Gribble, 16 shares of same; to Milfred and Meda Gribble, a summer cabin at Lake Almanor, California; to Phyrne Lorenz, 75 shares of Standard Oil Company stock; and to Milfred and Meda Gribble, the family residence and decedent’s cut glass and hand-painted china.
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