Warner v. City of Los Angeles

KAUS, J. Appeal from the denial of a writ of mandate sought by appellant in the superior court.

Respondents are the City of Los Angeles, its mayor, the members of the board of fire commissioners of the city and the chief of its fire department.

[905]Appellant is a fireman employed by respondent city. Invoking the Constitutions of our country and of our state he protests against a series of regulations and rules of the respondent board which force him to consume his meals at the same time and at the same place as other firemen while on 24 hour duty.1 The express purpose of the rules in question is to further respondents’ policy “against all discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin or religious belief. ...”

Appellant asks how respondents can violate his constitutional “freedom of association.” He is not asking the right question, which is, whether or not respondents in the interest of proper discipline and morale have the right to determine when and where firemen shall eat while on duty.

There is no question in our minds that the answer is “yes”. Whether or not the regulations are the best way to achieve the objective sought by respondents is not for us to say. The courts cannot run fire departments and the determination of respondents should not be disturbed unless it can plainly be seen that their regulations have no relation to a legitimate purpose or are a clear invasion of personal or property rights. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, 522 [20 Cal.Rptr. 638, 370 P.2d 342]; Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220 [118 P. 714],

We have carefully examined the constitutional authorities cited by appellant. None are in point when applied to a fireman who, upon joining a semi-military organization such as a fire department, necessarily subjects himself to a far greater measure of personal discipline than in another calling. State ex rel. Curtis v. Steinkellner, 247 Wis. 1 [18 N.W.2d 355]; Perez v. Board of Police Comrs., 78 Cal.App.2d 638 [178 P.2d 537].2

Appellant also contends that respondents are deprived of any power to make regulations designed to eliminate racial discrimination because the state has occupied the field [906]