McGill v. City & County of San Francisco

DEVINE, J. Appellant was a motorman employed by the Public Utilities Commission of the City and County of San Francisco for the Municipal Railway. His employment started April 8, 1957, but he was a limited tenure employee under section 145.1 of the city charter until April 17, 1962, when the manager of the railway took the first step to terminate appellant’s employment. The manager wrote a letter to the public utilities commission recommending dismissal. The commission referred the matter to the civil service commission because of section 145.1, which reads as follows: “Limited tenure appointments may be terminated by the appointing officer for good cause at any time with the approval of the Civil Service Commission without reference to the procedures governing removal set forth in section 154 hereof.” (Italics added.)

The civil service commission disapproved the termination but ordered that appellant be suspended for a period of 90 days. The manager asked for reconsideration but the civil service commission refused the request because, as the commission stated in a letter, “there had not been good cause for this termination,” and the commission reaffirmed its previous decision. The manager of the railway thereupon acted to terminate the employment without the approval of the civil service commission. Appellant then sought writ of mandate to compel his reinstatement. (Neither appellant nor respondents question the right of the civil service commission to impose the penalty of suspension.)

Judgment was rendered in favor of the individual members of the public utilities commission, upon sustaining of demurrer without leave to amend, and although the appeal is from the entire judgment, appellant has not urged this part of his appeal, presumably because there is no need to have a writ run against these commissioners. The essential parts of the judgment by the trial court are that the manager of the railway terminated appellant’s employment upon good cause; [37]that the civil service commission’s jurisdiction is restricted to a review of the appointing officer’s terminating action, and that if good cause actually is present, the officer’s action may not be reversed by the commission; and that in this case the commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction in determining there had not been good cause to support the manager’s action.

The facts which were before the civil service commission and the trial judge are quite simple. During the five years of appellant’s service, 22 complaints by passengers had been filed against him for discourtesy. In at least one of these instances, the record shows that the complaining party telephoned to the railway office saying he was at fault and wished to apologize. Also, appellant had been awarded a courtesy emblem and 12 commendations. He had been reprimanded for discourtesy and had been warned, on August 24, 1959, that continued reports of this offense would result in a recommendation for dismissal. He had been suspended twice, for one day and two days, respectively.