Carpenter v. Mohammed
Before: Brown, Gerald
BROWN (Gerald), J. This is an appeal from an order denying defendant’s motion to set aside a default judgment.
Defendant Shah Mohammed, a citizen and resident of West Pakistan, inherited an undivided one-half interest in' certain real property in Imperial County. In 1960 he entered into negotiations for the sale of his interest to the plaintiff Marvin W. Carpenter. In a letter dated August 6, 1960, defendant refused plaintiff’s offer of $8,750, and made a counteroffer of $11,000. The letter states, “If my this offer [$11,000] is acceptable to you, kindly send the necessary papers duly completed for my signatures etc.” The offer was accepted by the plaintiff on October 5, 1960. In addition to the $11,000 plaintiff was to pay all escrow charges (approximately $500, and all back taxes (approximately $3,000). The escrow papers were mailed to defendant, but he did not reply.
Suit was filed March 3, 1961, seeking damages, or in the alternative, specific performance. The action for damages was abandoned. A copy of the complaint and summons and a letter explaining the nature of the action were sent to the defendant. In June 1961, defendant replied that he had made the offer, but had not received the acceptance, and was referring the matter to the West Pakistanian Embassy and U.S. authorities. In reply plaintiff sent new escrow instructions and a deed.
The summons was published in an Imperial Valley newspaper under a court order dated August 25, 1961. Default was entered on May 2, 1962. A hearing was held on May 24, 1962, and judgment was entered July 25, 1962—16 months after the complaint had been filed.
A motion to set aside the judgment on the ground of excusable neglect and inadvertence, filed September 4, 1962, and amended October 9,1962, was denied November 21,1962.
The first contention of the defendant is that the original summons was not returned, hence the court lacked jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against him. It is well settled if a judgment should not have been entered at all, it may be set aside under proper circumstances. (Greif v. Dullea, 66 Cal.App.2d 986, 993 [153 P.2d 581]; Lynch v. Bencini, 17 Cal.2d 521 [110 P.2d 662].) It is also well settled that inclusion of any ground inconsistent with the sole claim that the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction is sufficient to convert a special appearance into a general appearance. (Shelley v. Casa De Oro, Ltd., 133 [586]
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