Barnett v. Hunt

PIERCE, P. J. Plaintiffs-respondents, attorneys in private practice, were employed by Cedar Creek Elementary [522]School District hy contract to oppose proceedings by which it was sought to have a portion of the district carved out and included within the boundaries of an adjoining district. The contract provided for studies, preparation of data, representation of the district by the attorneys in a hearing before the Board of Supervisors of Shasta County, and in court proceedings if necessary. Services were performed; the district was successful before the board of supervisors, which denied the petition for the boundary line change. Defendant-appellant superintendent of schools, on advice of defendant-appellant district attorney, refused to authorize payment of the agreed fee. Plaintiffs’ action followed and judgment was entered declaring the plaintiffs were entitled to collect.

The basis of the ruling of the trial court was that the contract was authorized under Education Code section 906.5, enacted in 1961, which authorizes a school district to contract for the services of attorneys in private practice “to prepare and conduct school district litigation, or to assist it in the preparation and conduct of school district litigation,...”

The contention of appellants is that this language should be given restrictive interpretation construing “litigation” as “A contest, authorized by law, in a court of justice, for the purpose of enforcing a right.” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.) Appellants would exclude services preceding and at a hearing before the board of supervisors as being neither “litigation” nor “preparation of litigation.” Plaintiffs-respondents argue, and the trial court found, that the services performed did fall within the purview of the section, thereby giving the language a more liberal construction.1

In our view it is unnecessary to interpret Education Code section 906.5 (which incidentally in 1963 was renumbered as section 1016 (Stats. 1963, eh. 629), then readopted with an amendment as section 906.5 again (Stats. 1963, eh. 2070)) because regardless of its applicability the contract, under the facts existing here, was valid without any express statutory authorization. This thesis will be developed below.

As stated above, plaintiffs were employed to represent the district in proposed boundary-changing proceedings.

[523]