Waters v. San Dimas Ready Mix Concrete

KINGSLEY, J. Action to recover difference between wages paid plaintiff and amounts payable under collective bargaining agreement.

Although the facts are not in dispute the parties are poles apart as to the applicable rules of law to the facts hereinafter set forth.

Leslie L. Waters (plaintiff herein), a member of The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-housemen & Helpers of America, was employed by San Dimas Ready Mix Concrete (defendant herein) from February 1956 to February 1960, as a driver of concrete mix trucks. During the period of this employment defendant had entered into two collective bargaining agreements with The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America. The first agreement was in force from October 1, 1955, to September 30, 1958; and the second was in force from October 1, 1958, until September 30, 1961. The collective bargaining agreements provided, among other things, that employees would be paid time and one-half straight time for all work performed in excess of eight hours in any one day or in excess of forty hours in any week, whichever was the greater.

Defendant employed an average of eight truck drivers. Its operation was small, with 25 per cent of the orders coming in on an hour’s notice. If there were no deliveries to be made after the lunch period defendant usually dismissed the drivers for the remainder of the day. Split shifts were prohibited by the agreements. Should orders come in after the drivers had been sent home, outside drivers were hired to make the deliveries. Had defendant not operated in this fashion, the regular drivers might do nothing for several hours only to make a late delivery which would result in overtime, requiring one and one-half times regular pay.

The employees preferred defendant to keep the crew small and not to put on additional men, and to work whatever time there would be available at straight time pay. To eliminate any misunderstanding, each man, including plaintiff, was given a slip of paper or ballot to choose whether to work on a straight time basis or to adhere strictly to the union contract. The decision of the employees, including plaintiff, was unanimous to work at regular straight time, regardless of the number of hours worked. Plaintiff admits that he was never forced by defendant to sign the aforesaid, nor was [382]plaintiff promised more hours if he would accept regular pay.