Dawson v. Standard Oil Co.

BISHOP, J. pro tem.* The plaintiffs, claiming that the defendant had a continuing obligation to account to them for a percentage of the value of the oil, and other hydrocarbon substances, that it obtained by slant drilling from under their land, brought this action for a declaratory judgment. The defendant not only confirmed the existence of differing views, by answer, but also filed a cross-complaint in interpleader, naming the plaintiffs and two others, Paula L. Lawrence and Fred W. Marlow, as cross-defendants. Later, by stipulation, a cross-complaint for declaratory relief was substituted for the original cross-complaint.

At the trial evidence was “introduced by way of diverse documents and stipulated facts,” as the judgment recites, and the cause was submitted on them. Judgment was then entered decreeing, first, that “Standard has no obligation whatsoever nor has Standard ever had any obligation under that certain agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Stocker Strip Agreement, dated April 4, 1951 by and between George C. Stroebe and Sue C. Stroebe, as Grantor, and Standard, as Grantee, and in particular Paragraph 3 thereof, to account for and pay to Reginald S. F. Dawson and llene M. Dawson, or either of them, any sums or other moneys whatsoever including but not limited to any sums representing a proportionate share of the sale value of 2%% of all oil, gas and gasoline produced, saved, sold and extracted by means of slant wells drilled through the Stocker Lands referred to in said Stocker Strip Agreement;... ”

Additional provisions of the judgment declared that payments made and to be made by the defendant to “Paula L. Lawrence . . . and Fred W. Marlow” constituted a satisfaction and discharge of its obligation under paragraph 3 of the Stocker Strip Agreement. As we deem that that which aggrieved the plaintiffs, causing them to appeal, was the first provision of the judgment, the one that we have quoted, we are not setting forth the terms of the remaining paragraphs of the judgment.

Interestingly enough, plaintiffs were not parties to the Stocker Strip Agreement; yet it is the document upon which they base their contention that it is to them that Standard should account for at least a part of a “proportionate share of the sale value of 2%% of the oil, ” etc. that Standard abstracts. Plaintiffs stand last in line as grantees under the [88]instruments mentioned in the stipulation of facts upon which the judgment is based. The first, dated April 4, 1951, was the “Stocker Strip Agreement” referred to in the judgment. As to the terms of this agreement it suffices now to say that it was a grant by the owners, the Stroebes, to defendant Standard of “a right of way and easement to drill slant wells” into and through the Stroebes’ lot 3, the wells at no point to be less than 100 feet below the surface.