Thomas v. County of Siskiyou

PIERCE, P. J. In this tort action a motion by defendant county for judgment on the pleadings was granted by the court.

The second amended complaint alleges that defendant county through its agents, officers and employees negligently permitted a juvenile delinquent and ward of the juvenile court to be placed for board and lodging with plaintiff who operated a foster home; that they knew said ward had dangerous propensities, a fact known to defendant but of which plaintiff was unapprised. The ward is alleged to have attacked plaintiff with a metal pipe on May 12, 1960, inflicting serious bodily injuries.

The sole basis of the court’s ruling granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings was that Civil Code section 22.3 enacted by the Legislature in 1961 (Stats. 1961, eh. 1404) was intended to abrogate the rule of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457], holding that the rule of governmental immunity could no longer be invoked as a defense by a public body, relieving it from liability1- from torts of its agents acting in a ministerial capacity; that this abrogation of the Muskopf rule applied to causes of action accruing prior to February 27, 1961.

This judgment on the pleadings was filed October 27, 1961. In April 1962 the Supreme Court filed its opinion in Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488 [20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325], holding that the legislation referred to had not abrogated the Muskopf rule, but had merely suspended its effective operation until 91 days following the adjournment of the 1963'session and that would be automatically [121]reinstated on the specified date in the absence of further legislation. It was also held that it was the legislative intent to do nothing more than suspend for the same period the prosecution of causes of action accruing prior to February 27, 1961.

Civil Code section 22.3 was not only the sole basis of the trial court’s ruling in the instant case; it was also the only ground urged in the trial court by defendant to support its motion. Defendant now urges that the Public Liability Act (Gov. Code, § 53050, et seq.) somehow affects this action and takes it out of the scope of the Muskopf ruling. We find it impossible to follow this argument, since the act referred to relates only to actions involving torts arising from a dangerous or defective condition of public property. It is therefore inapplicable.