Maldonado v. Linza

FILES, J. This is an action by a real estate broker against his client to recover a commission. Plaintiff is appealing from a judgment against him after a court trial. All of appellant’s arguments are based upon the claimed insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the trial court. Appellant is here under a misconception of the function of an appellate court. He opens his argument with this statement (without citation of authority): “If, upon a review of all the evidence, the reviewing court is left with a definite conviction that, although there is evidence to support each of the Findings, a mistake has been made, the reviewing court must reverse.”

Perhaps no statement of law has appeared more frequently in the reports than the rule which governs this appeal: “When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact. [Citation.]

“ When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805, 807 [313 P.2d 848].)

Despite the misdirection of counsel’s argument this court has, in view of counsel’s strenuous insistence that the decision is unjust, examined the record and has determined that there is substantial evidence which supports the findings and judgment.

Defendants are three partners who owned an apartment house. Under date of July 20, 1959, they gave plaintiff a six months’ exclusive listing to sell the property for a price of $95,500. As set forth in the written listing contract, the terms of the sale were: “Down payment $17,500.00 plus new maximum loan. . . . Will take 2nd T.D. Yes. $ submit Mo. @ 6.6%.” The property was at that time encumbered by a $51,000 first trust deed and a $9,000 second.

On October 20, 1959, plaintiff produced an offer made by Mr. and Mrs. Valov, which involved an exchange. Defendants considered this offer and rejected it.

On October 21, 1959, there was a discussion between plain[653]tiff and defendants which resulted in a definite oral agreement as to the terms which defendants would accept. The trial court found (and this finding is not attacked) that from October 21 on, the listing terms were as follows: Cash, $17,500; new first trust deed loan for the minimum amount of $60,000 (this being the amount necessary to pay off existing encumbrances) ; a second trust deed back to the sellers for the balance, bearing 6.6 per cent interest, monthly payments, including interest, to be 1 per cent of the face value.