Conrotto v. Gagliasso

SHOEMAKER, J. This is an appeal from a judgment refusing to cancel and set aside certain deeds and documents made by Margherita Gagliasso to her sons and a daughter-in-law.

The plaintiffs are Margherita’s three daughters. The defendants are her three sons and a daughter-in-law.1 The alleged ground for cancellation is that the various gifts were procured by the fraud and undue influence of these four defendants.

The record shows that on January 17, 1945, the decedent, Margherita Gagliasso, deeded substantially all of her real property to her sons John, Fiuri and Charles; on January 31, 1946, she deeded an additional one-acre parcel to her sons John and Fiuri; and that on January 12, 1953, she assigned her interest in two deeds of trust to John, Joseph, Charles, Fiuri and his wife Elvira.

The bulk of the testimony produced related to Margherita’s mental capabilities at the time of the various transfers and the presence or lack of undue influence on the part of the various defendants.

Substantial evidence was presented by the parties to this litigation bearing upon these issues. It was highly conflicting. The jury returned a special verdict finding that none of the deeds or other gifts had been procured by the fraud or undue influence of the defendants. The trial court made findings in accord with the special verdict and also found that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, since Margherita herself had made no attempt to set aside the gifts prior to her death and her heirs were therefore barred. Findings of fact so made are accepted by and will not be disturbed by an appellate court. Judgment was for defendants.

Appellants first attack the trial court’s ruling with respect, [673]to a 1953 will of Margherita Gagliasso. The action complained of occurred after counsel for respondents had offered Margherita’s 1943, 1947, 1951, 1952 and 1953 wills into evidence, for the purpose of showing that she had intended to leave her real property to her sons even prior to 1945 and had consistently reaffirmed the 1945 deeds in her later wills. At that time, the court asked counsel for appellants if he had any objection to the introduction of the wills, and he replied that he had not. The wills were accordingly admitted into evidence, but not shown to the jurors. Thereafter, counsel for appellants read selections from each of the wills to the jury.