Silva v. Patterson
Before: Peek
PEEK, J. The present controversy arises out of a lease and contract of sale by which plaintiffs, as owners and operators of a dairy ranch, leased the same to defendants and by contract sold to the latter certain personal property then on the ranch. Subsequently, dissension arose between the parties, culminating in an action being filed by plaintiffs wherein they sought restitution of the ranch, forfeiture of defendants’ interest in the personal property, damages for wrongful withholding of the premises and the personal property, judgment on a promissory note, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
Plaintiffs and defendants were dairy operators of approximately 40 and 24 years’ experience, respectively. The ranch always had been operated by plaintiffs as a Grade A dairy. On September 30, 1952, the lease and sale in question were executed. On May 28, 1955, the parties modified the terms of the original lease by a supplemental agreement by which defendants admitted that they were then in default, not only in the payment of the rent due to plaintiffs, but also on the interest due pursuant to the sales contract.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found that the rental provisions set forth in the lease contained a latent ambiguity ; that the provisions in question meant that the defendants were to pay rent based on the average price set by the Bureau of Milk Control for Grade A, Class 1 milk in the Tehama-Shasta marketing area; that the price so found could not be reduced by the deductions claimed by defendants; that defendants under such interpretation owed to the plaintiffs certain sums for rent past due; that defendants were also in arrears in interest and principal on the conditional sales contract; that defendants had no right, title, or interest in the premises or the personalty, except for certain enumerated exceptions; and that plaintiffs should have judgment on the note, together with attorneys’ fees and costs.
Defendants’ contentions are essentially attacks upon the sufficiency of the evidence, the first of which is that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of the lease relative to notice of default; therefore, their action was premature and hence, the trial court erred in overruling their motion to bar the introduction of any evidence.
The particular provision of the lease involved in this contention (Paragraph XVI) reads as follows:
“In the event of default by vendees and lessees in any of the provisions of this contract vendors and lessors shall give [717]
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