Moore v. Moore

WARNS, J. pro tem.* Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on April 21, 1960, decreeing that the partnership existing between the plaintiffs and the defendant under the firm name of Moore Truck Lines, was dissolved as of December 19, 1956, and ordering plaintiffs to pay to defendant the sum of $12,918.21, which sum represented defendant’s interest in the partnership on the date of dissolution.

Appellant first contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings and conclusion of the trial court that the partnership was dissolved on or about December 19, 1956. As stated by this court in Pores v. Purity Milk Co., 135 Cal.App.2d 305, 307 [287 P.2d 169] : . if the factual [131]determination made by the trier of fact is supported by competent and legally sufficient evidence, an appellate court is bound by that determination even though there is an abundance of record evidence to the contrary.” And at page 309, “It is not the province of a reviewing court to comment on each evidentiary conflict or disagreement or to present a detailed argument on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. [Citing cases.] ”

We do not deem it necessary or useful to make a detailed statement of all the evidence that was presented in this ease. Suffice it to say the parties entered into a copartnership agreement to carry on a trucking business known as Moore Truck Lines. The agreement required that “Each partner will give his time and effort to the operation of the truck line. ’ ’ However, from December 2, 1956 on, the appellant did not participate in or devote any substantial time or effort to the partnership business. Respondent Frank L. Moore testified that the appellant called him about December 1, 1956, and told him that he, the appellant, was quitting the business. In April 1957, appellant with his family moved to Albuquerque, New Mexico, purchased a home, and in the summer of 1957 he enrolled as a student in the College of Pharmacy at the University of New Mexico, and, at the time of trial, was still in that status, although the trucking operations of the partnership were confined to the San Francisco Bay Area and the San Joaquin Valley. While appellant testified, in effect, that he left and went to Albuquerque because of his physical condition it is obvious that the trial court did not believe him. It further appears that from the time of the inception of the partnership in January 1955 to December 1956, the appellant’s conduct led to constant bickering and serious arguments between the appellant and the other partners. During this period of time appellant withdrew profits against the wishes of the other partners. There was also testimony that as a result of appellant’s abandonment of the partnership the business became disorganized and lost revenue. This evidence is legally sufficient to support the findings and conclusion of the trial court that the partnership was dissolved. (Corp. Code, §§ 15029, 15032, subd. (1) (b), (c) and (d); Owens v. Cohen, 19 Cal .2d 147, 151 [119 P.2d 713].)