Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Steele

SHEPARD, J. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, a national banking association, executor of the estate of Joseph S. Thurston, deceased (hereinafter called “Bank”), and Old Homestead, a corporation (hereinafter [64]called “Homestead”), brought this action against Van A. Steele (hereinafter called “Steele”), for reformation, termination of agreement, and declaratory relief regarding a real estate brokerage contract between Joseph S. Thurston, Bank’s deceased (hereinafter called “Thurston”), and Steele, covering sales of certain land in Laguna Beach. Steele cross-complained, likewise for declaratory relief, and for money judgment. Judgment was rendered for Steele, against Bank and Homestead, on both the complaint and the cross-complaint, in substance holding the brokerage contract valid and awarding Steele $3,000 earned brokerage. Bank and Homestead appeal.

Appellants base their appeal on the sole ground that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. Since this is the only ground of appeal, it is well to keep firmly in mind the oft-repeated and long-established rule regarding the position of the appellate court on such a ground. It is well and succinctly stated by our Supreme Court in Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal.2d 567, 583 [1-3] [2 Cal.Rptr. 609, 349 P.2d 289], as follows:

“ ‘When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact,’ and ‘ When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts ... if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the finding; and in searching the record and exploring the inferences which may arise from what is found there, to discover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court should be realistic and practical.’ [Citation.] ”

Bearing this rule in mind and disregarding conflicts, the general substance of the facts shown by the record is as follows: Thurston and Steele had been acquainted as neighbors for about 14 years. Thurston owned a considerable acreage in Laguna Beach which he desired to subdivide and sell. Steele was a licensed real estate broker. Prank Pitts (hereinafter called “Pitts”), an attorney at law in Laguna Beach, was acquainted with both. Pitts had done legal work for Thurston, and both Steele and Thurston had visited Pitts’ office together. In the winter of 1954-1955, Thurston started subdivision of his acreage into building lots in a tract numbered 2204. He