People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Chastain
Before: Peek
PEEK, J. The present controversy arises out of an eminent domain proceeding instituted by plaintiff by which it sought to condemn for freeway purposes certain lands owned by defendant Roger Jessup Farms. At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of Jessup in the sum of $15,640.80. Of that sum $6,510 represented the value of the land, and the remainder, $9,130.80, represented the severance damages. A judgment was entered in accordance therewith. Defendant then moved for a new trial which was [806]denied, and this appeal followed. Although S. B. Chastain was joined as a defendant in the original action, he is not a party to this appeal. The sole question presented concerns the issue of severance damages.
The record shows that defendant is the owner of approximately 2,800 acres of land in Madera and Merced Counties which is used unitarily for agricultural purposes. United States Highway 99 runs diagonally through the property in a northwesterly and southeasterly direction so that roughly 2.000 acres are situated on the west side of the highway and 800 acres on the east side. The land immediately between the 2.000 acres and the highway is subject to an easement to the Southern Pacific Company. The ranch headquarters are situated on the smaller parcel, and while the highway remained in its previous condition, the defendant, in the course of its agricultural activities, could and did cross over the highway directly in front of these buildings, as well as at three other points. The crossings had been so used for more than 40 years.
Pursuant to the over-all plan to improve the highways of this State, plaintiff proposed to widen the existing roadbed of United States Highway 99, constructing fences on either side thereof, and closing all of the crossover points on the highway by constructing concrete barriers between the north and south lanes of traffic, the result being that defendant would be compelled to travel from its headquarters to the southernmost crossover, a distance of more than 11,000 feet, and to the north a distance of more than 10,000 feet.
The testimony of the two expert witnesses called by plaintiff upon the issue of severance damages was that defendant would be damaged in the sum of $8,400 and $13,700, respectively. Only one expert witness was called by the defendant, and it was his opinion that such damages would be approximately $47,000. When he attempted to support this figure by showing the increased cost to defendant by reason of the loss of the right to cross the highway as it had been able to formerly, plaintiff moved to strike all such testimony on the ground that it was not a proper element of severance damages. The trial court, in sustaining the objection, instructed the witness to limit his testimony merely to the damages resulting from a denial of access to Highway 99, excluding any question of the right of crossover as it previously existed. It is this ruling by the court which forms the sole basis of defendant’s appeal.
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