Chapman v. Chapman
Before: Dyke
VAN DYKE, P. J. Respondents, who were plaintiffs in this action in the trial court, are the heirs at law of William Robert Chapman, deceased. William’s widow, Nora, was joined during the proceedings for reasons not here material. The other respondents, and who were the original plaintiffs, are his three children, John Thurston Chapman, Ethel May Ramey, and Robert William Chapman. Appellant is the widow and the administratrix of the estate of John Chapman, who was the father by a former marriage of William. This appellant and her deceased husband, John, by impressing a action was brought to enforce an inter vivos contract between constructive trust upon certain real property inventoried by appellant in the estate of John, who had died intestate. Appellant admitted the execution of the contract, but contended herein that it had been rescinded. She also asserted that respondents were estopped to enforce it by reason of William’s acts and conduct during his lifetime. The decree of the trial court was adverse to appellant and she appeals.
The real property which is the subject of this action was the separate property of John. In 1941, appellant, Minnie Chapman, filed against John a suit for separate maintenance, and during its pendency the agreement in question was entered into. By that agreement John bound himself to make and never to revoke, so long as he and Minnie lived together as husband and wife, a will whereby he disposed of three parcels of real property in the following manner: Parcel 1 to Minnie. Parcel 2 to William, “or his heirs or lineal descendants.” Parcel 3, one-half to Minnie and one-half to William “or his heirs or lineal descendants.” The contract was executed in 1941. Shortly thereafter, John executed a will in accordance therewith. On February 25, 1952, John requested and received his will from the attorney who drafted the same. He then revoked it. On March 8,1952, he conveyed the subject real property as follows: Parcel 1 to Minnie and himself in joint tenancy. Parcel 2 to William and himself in joint tenancy. Parcel 3 to himself, to Minnie, and to William in joint tenancy. William died December 26, 1953, predeceasing John, who died May 26, 1956.
The decree of the trial court declared respondents to be the owners in equal shares as tenants in common of Parcel 2. It further declared that respondents were the owners in equal shares and as tenants in common of an undivided one-half interest in Parcel 3. Respondents asserted no claim to Parcel 1 which had vested in appellant on the death of John.
[205]
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