Steiner v. Parker

BRAY, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $4,278 for architectural services rendered.

Questions Presented

1. Sufficiency of evidence.

2. Statute of limitations.

1. Evidence.

Plaintiff was a licensed architect. In April, 1953, Mr. Parker, defendant’s husband, visited plaintiff’s office and discussed the improvement of Berkeley property owned by Parker and defendant in joint tenancy. Thereafter plaintiff worked on designs for a medical building, a women’s dormitory and an apartment house. Subsequently plaintiff and Mr. Parker had “perhaps a dozen” conferences concerning the architectural work at which defendant was present at “perhaps half of them” and participated in the discussions.

December 5, 1953, Parker died, at which time defendant requested plaintiff to cease the work. About a week later she requested him to continue with the plans on the apartment house. In mid-January, 1954, defendant ordered plaintiff to stop. At this time the work was in the final preliminary drawing stage of the apartment house project. On May 18, 1953, plaintiff sent Mr. and Mrs. Parker a letter outlining the architectural services to be rendered and the fees to be paid. If the work proceeded to completion of preliminary drawings, the fee would be one-fifth of 8 per cent of the reasonable estimated cost of construction, 75 per cent of the fee to be paid at the time the contract was awarded. If stopped prior to completion of the drawings, payment would be based upon office costs plus overhead.

The work on the medical building plans stopped at Parker’s request in mid-August, 1953, on the dormitory plans in November, and on the apartment building either on December 6, as contended by defendant, or in mid-January, 1954, as testified by plaintiff (either date is within the statutory period). The action was brought November 16, 1955. Defendant contends that the services rendered for the medical building [25]and dormitory plans terminated more than two years prior to filing suit and hence were barred by section 339, subdivision (1), Code of Civil Procedure (two years).

Plaintiff testified that he understood that no bill was to be sent until his work was completed. Plaintiff testified to the reasonable costs and overhead in the amount allowed by the court. Defendant denied that she asked plaintiff to continue with the plans after her husband’s death. She stated that on December 15 or 16, shortly after her husband’s death, plaintiff called at her home and when she asked him how much she owed him he replied that she did not owe him anything. Defendant’s main attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s finding is based npon this testimony of defendant, which defendant claims was not denied by plaintiff. However, plaintiff, when asked whether he told defendant that she did not owe him anything, replied, “No; I don’t remember that. Q. You don’t remember that? A. No.” The trial court properly could, and obviously did, treat this as a denial. The property was in joint tenancy. The husband, as is common, acted as manager. Originally he contacted plaintiff, but thereafter both husband and wife participated in discussions about- the projects with plaintiff. The letter was addressed to both defendant and her husband. The evidence amply shows that plaintiff rendered services at the direct request of defendant and, or through, her husband acting as her agent. (Agency of a husband to represent his wife may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Brown v. Oxtoby (1941), 45 Cal.App.2d 702, 708 [114 P.2d 622].)