People v. Cromeenes

VAN DYKE, P. J. Appellant was convicted of statutory rape. The cause was tried to the court, a jury having been waived.

On April 18, 1958, appellant was living with Marie Sutton, the mother of the complaining witness. He described Marie as his common-law wife. The relationship had existed for some time. He had a child by Marie. The complaining witness, 13 years of age, lived with the couple. The girl testified that on April 1, 1958, at about 9 p. m., and after she had gone to bed, appellant came to her bed and had intercourse with her. A few days thereafter she went to her grandmother and told her about the incident. On April 8th, she and her grandmother went to the district attorney’s office. Appellant was arrested April 9th in Sacramento where he was in jail for some minor offense. He made a statement to a police officer and a deputy district attorney of San Joaquin County, which [635]amounted to a complete confession. At the trial, after the girl had testified, the prosecution over defense objections introduced the confession of appellant in evidence and rested. Appellant testified that he did not have intercourse with the girl and that the statement he made to the officers had been obtained as a result of a threat by the district attorney’s office to arrest his common-law wife. He said that her physical condition was such that if she were placed in jail she would not, in his opinion, have lived 30 days and that he would have confessed to anything to prevent her arrest. He did not deny that he had made the statements introduced in evidence, but did assert that the statements were false.

The errors complained of revolve around the proceedings to determine whether or not appellant’s confession had been voluntary. A stenographic reporter had been taken to Sacramento with the officers and at the trial he was made a witness and asked to read the conversation between the officers and appellant. He testified that appellant’s statements had been made voluntarily. This was challenged and he was taken on cross-examination. It then appeared that the officers had talked with appellant before the witness had been asked to come in and take the statement and that the witness did not know what occurred prior to his being called in. Thereupon the deputy district attorney, a Mr. Corren, was called by appellant to testify concerning the conversations that preceded the formal statement. Appellant contends that his counsel’s examination of the deputy was prejudicially curtailed by the trial court. The following occurred: The witness testified that before the statement was taken he had a conversation with appellant. He was asked if during that conversation he had informed appellant at any time that he had sufficient evidence to prosecute Marie and that it was probable that some action would be taken. This the witness denied. He was then asked if there was anything said concerning Marie, and the witness replied: “A. Yes, there certainly was a conversation concerning his wife. Q. Yes, sir. A. Would you like to hear what it was ? A. Just a moment until I ask the question. The Court : I hope you are not going to call Mr. Corren a liar? Mr. Chargin' [Attorney for defendant] : No, Your Honor, no, Your Honor. Mr. Chargin': Q. Sir, in reference to this conversation, was there any mention of her being prosecuted? A. There was no mention of her being prosecuted. Q. Was there any mention of her being arrested? A. There was no mention of her being arrested. Q. Do you recall her [sic] say