Bandy v. Municipal Court

DORAN, J. The petition alleges that appellant is a certified shorthand reporter ‘ ‘ fully qualified and entitled to appear in any and all courts of the State . . . when hired so to do by litigants or their counsel”; that over a four year period many lawyers have hired petitioner to so appear but have been “informed by the Clerk of the Municipal Court of San Antonio Judicial District that one, and only one firm of Court Reporters were permitted to appear and take down proceedings . . ., to-wit, the firm of Bob Stevens & Associates.”

It is further alleged that “there is not now, nor has there ever been, since January 1, 1952, an Official Court Reporter” of said court, and that there has been no “examinations testing the competency of any person or persons for the position,” [737]nor evidence of good character required, in accordance with the statutes. It is also alleged that by reason of the court’s order, “Petitioner has been forced to breach his contracts with said attorneys” and has been damaged in the sum of $80,000.00; that petitioner is the real party in interest; that said order is discriminatory and “is arbitrary, capricious and unlawful.”

An alternative writ of mandate was ordered, commanding said court “to cause to be conducted, examinations and tests leading to the appointment of Official Court Reporter,” or that cause be shown why the same has not been done. To this writ return was made alleging that on January 1, 1952, the judges of said municipal court appointed Bob Stevens and B. S. Brink as official court reporters, and that on August 10, 1956, in compliance with the alternative writ, the judges named this firm as official reporters; “that all of said persons have qualified, as required by law, to be official reporters” and that the “petitioner has never qualified as an official court reporter” pursuant to law. On this showing, and it having been stipulated that the facts stated in respondent’s answer were true, the peremptory writ of mandate sought by petitioner was denied and the alternative writ discharged.

The judgment must be affirmed. In response to appellant’s petition, an alternative writ of mandate required the municipal court in question to “cause to be conducted, examinations and tests leading to the appointment of Official Court Reporter.” The return to this writ, the truth of which is conceded, shows that on August 10, 1956, the judges did appoint certain persons, but not appellant, to act as official reporters, and that such persons “have qualified, as required by law.” The alternative writ could not and did not order the appointment of appellant; it could only require the municipal court to act in the premises, which respondent has now done.