People v. Creswell

BARNARD, P. J. The defendant was charged with arson and, in a second count, with burglary. A jury found her guilty of arson and not guilty on the second count. The People have appealed from an order granting her motion for a new trial.

The fire in question occurred in a building in Big Bear, and was reported to the fire department at 12:48 a.m. on June 2, 1952. Two witnesses, who admitted that they set the fire, testified at the trial that they had done so at the request of the defendant, giving the details in that connection and telling where they had all gone and what they had done over a period of several hours, including the time the fire must have been set. The places mentioned were all within a short distance of where the fire occurred. Aside from the testimony of these admitted accomplices there was no direct evidence connecting the defendant with the setting of the fire. The motion for a new trial was presented and argued solely on the question as to whether the testimony of the accomplices was sufficiently corroborated.

The appellant contends that in passing upon this issue the [586]court applied standards contrary to those used in People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105 [194 P.2d 681], and other eases in which the corroborative evidence was held sufficient; that this resulted in an improper holding that the evidence in this case was not sufficient, legally to constitute corroboration; and that the evidence here was stronger than that held to be sufficient in some of the cases cited.

In the cited cases a new trial had been denied, and a factual finding was being reviewed. The evidence which the appellant relies on as legally sufficient to show corroboration is respondent’s admission that she was with the accomplices at all times that night except for a few minutes about 12 midnight; her denial that she had told a witness that she arrived home at 1 a.m. and her later admission that she had told him this; her statements to an investigator including: “I suppose they are blaming us Indians for setting that place on fire” at a time when no one had been accused of setting the fire, another, that the owner of the burned building was ‘‘no good,” and a third reflecting on his ancestry; her statement to another witness indicating that she might have hidden an article which the accomplices testified she had taken from the burning building; her statement that she saw one Betterly drive onto the highway as she returned to her home with the accomplices at 1 a.m.; and Betterly’s testimony that when he heard the alarm he drove onto the highway in front of respondent’s home and proceeded to the fire.