Magee v. Breckenridge

GRIFFIN, J. Plaintiff brought this action against defendant to recover $3,560.81 for the reasonable value of services and material claimed to have been furnished to defendant. The court found that defendant B. B. Breckenridge was indebted to plaintiff individually for $2,514.81 and to him as intervener and as trustee and receiver for B. G. & S. Drilling Company, a copartnership, in the sum of $600. By stipulation, Stewart Magee, as receiver, was permitted to intervene in this action.

Defendant answered, denied generally the allegations of the complaint, and alleged, as a separate defense, that defendant was the owner of a lease upon certain proven oil-producing property near Newhall; that one Harris was the agent of plaintiff; that plaintiff was the operator of a portable oil well digging rig; and that he, as principal, instructed Harris, as agent, to secure work for his rig and also secure for him leases in that district; that about December, 1949, defendant agreed with Harris, as agent, that if plaintiff would recondition a certain oil well on defendant’s land and furnish his outfit, etc., before December 12, defendant would give plaintiff a lease on certain of his properties, subject to a royalty of 26% per cent; that a memorandum agreement (set up in the answer) to wit:

"12/2/49.

"C. A. Harris—

"If you will have your rig on my ^¡fcl well within 5 days (& work up to six days 24 hrs per day you furnish bits, Rig men, repairs to Rig etc. I to furnish cement mud electric log, whipstock & liner,) Then I will give you a lease on all my property west of my tanks—at 26% Royalty total You to drill a well within 30 days after moving off my #1 well—

B. B. Breckenridge.”

was signed by Harris and defendant; that plaintiff moved his portable rig upon defendant’s land on December 11, and operated it until December 18, when his rig became unusable because of mechanical failure, and plaintiff discontinued his work and the contract; that defendant thereafter, at his own [227]cost, repaired said rig and undertook to continue said work until January 6, 1950, at which time the work was completed; that early in December, 1949, defendant executed and delivered to Harris, as agent, a lease of defendant’s property, as agreed, and that on January 17, 1950, to amplify the description of the property in the first lease, defendant executed and delivered a similar substitute lease. Defendant prayed that plaintiff take nothing by reason of his complaint.