Crane v. City of Ukiah

VAN DYKE, J. On October 15, 1948, plaintiff and respondent Crane entered into a contract with defendant city of Ukiah, a municipal corporation, whereby Crane undertook, as general contractor, to construct a reservoir for the city. On October 27, 1948, defendant and appellant Whipple and the city entered into a contract whereby he was employed as consulting engineer to furnish and provide all necessary engineering services in connection with the construction of the reservoir for a fee of $7,250. Crane’s contract with the city required that he complete the work of construction in [641120] working days, which requirement he did not comply with. Upon his application the city granted two extensions of time and the reservoir was finally completed on January 4, 1950. The first extension of time was granted April 20, 1949, and the minutes of the council showed that the application for extension was granted “with the provision there is no further expense to the City of Ukiah” and the recital that “Councilman Hughes stated Mr. Crane had agreed to pay the additional engineering fees at the time the extensions of time were granted.” Upon this subject Crane testified at the trial that he appeared before the city council on April 20th, requested the extension of time, was asked by the council whether or not, if the extension was granted, there would be additional expense to the city for engineering services, and that he had agreed that if there were any extra engineering costs incurred by the city he would bear them; that the second extension was made upon the same condition; that he was acquainted with the provisions of Whipple’s contract with the city for engineering; and that when he told the council he would bear any extra engineering costs that might accrue because of the extensions granted him he had in mind and had read the Whipple contract which provided that Whipple would receive a fixed fee for doing the work and that in view of that provision he could not see where there could be any additional charges. Appellant Whipple rendered the engineering services called for, not only during the initial period of 120 days working time, but through the various extensions. Up to April 18, 1949, which approximately measured the 120-day work period, Whipple billed the city at various times and was paid the full fee of $7,250 specified in his contract as the amount which he was to be paid for all necessary engineering. Thereafter and through the periods of the extensions granted he continued to render engineering services and continued to submit bills. For the period between April 18, 1949, and June 30th of the same year he billed the city and was paid a total of $2,936.32, and for the period from July 31st to December 30th of that year he billed the city for an additional total of $4,657.60, which claims were approved by the council, but were not paid. It thus appeared that, after an agreed credit of $202.92 upon these claims against the city had been given, appellant Whipple had been allowed payments and approved claims totaling $7,391 in addition to the contract fee of $7,250.