Civil Service Commission v. Superior Court
Before: Barnard
BARNARD, P. J. This is an application for a writ prohibiting the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of a certain action, an order to show cause having been issued.
The action in question was brought by eight employees of San Diego County, for themselves and as representing all employees in eight classifications, based on the contention that the board of supervisors had fixed salaries in these classifications for the year 1950-1951 too low and in violation of section 40 of the county charter, which reads as follows:
“Section 40. In fixing compensation the Board of Supervisors shall at least annually, by ordinance, provide in each instance for the payment of not less than the prevailing or general current rate of compensation or wages paid by private employers in the County of San Diego for similar quality or quantity of service, in case such prevailing compensation or wages can be ascertained.”
[855]Section 79(a) of this charter requires the civil service commission to classify all positions based on the respective duties and for the purpose of fixing salaries, its report to be submitted to and approved by the board of supervisors in its annual appropriation ordinance, and further provides that this classification must be considered by the board at two meetings held at least 30 days apart.
The action was for declaratory relief and for a writ of mandate. The first cause of action alleged that the plaintiffs were entitled to have their pay fixed in accordance with section 40 of the charter; that the board ignored this section in fixing such compensation; and that the prevailing wages in these classifications were those established by the respective unions to which the plaintiffs belonged. A second cause of action alleged that the rates adopted by the board in 1949 for certain public works, under sections 1770 and 1773 of the Labor Code, were binding on the board in fixing the compensation here in question. A third cause of action alleged that the board, in adopting the salary ordinance, was bound to apply new rates established by the unions after the civil service commission had made its classification report. A fourth cause of action alleged that section 40 applies as a basic rate when an employee begins work for the county, and that any other privileges or benefits later accruing to him may not be considered in determining whether section 40 of the charter has been properly applied. The prayer was for a declaration of rights in accordance with the allegations of the complaint, and for a writ of mandate compelling the board to fix the compensation in these classifications in accordance with the allegations of the complaint, and to make these rates retroactive to the date of the adoption of the salary ordinance.
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)