Bennett v. Superior Court

MUSSELL, J. In this proceeding in certiorari, petitioner, an attorney, .seeks to annul an order of the superior court adjudging him guilty of contempt and assessing a fine there- . for in the sum of $500.

Petitioner, representing plaintiff Ruth E. Hunt, filed an action for damages for personal injuries in the superior court of San Diego county against the San Diego Transit System. The trial was had before respondent judge, without a jury, and at the conclusion thereof, the court ordered a judgment in favor of the defendant and also issued a written order adjudging petitioner guilty of contempt. The order recites “That during said trial the conduct thereof was unduly delayed by conscious, wilful and contumacious action and conduct upon the part of said Vernon P. Bennett, with a view of preventing the defendant named from having a fair and just trial in said action upon the issues joined, and of unnecessarily consuming the time of said court. All of said contumacious conduct of said Vernon P. Bennett herein mentioned was committed in the immediate presence of the court, while the court was in session, and during said trial, and said conduct is shown in part by the quotations from the-testimony and. proceedings at said trial, particularly as follows Numerous excerpts from the testimony and proceedings, which were relied upon by the court to show the alleged contumacious conduct of petitioner, are then set forth. These excerpts, according to the order, show constant and re- : peated interruptions and statements by the petitioner during the examination of witnesses by opposing counsel; the interposition of objections .and the indulgence in argument in bad faith; the attempt to introduce in evidence certain documents as depositions; the argument of objections after the court’s .rulings thereon; the making of irrelevant and immaterial statements, frequent quarreling and bickering with opposing [587]counsel; and the inclusion in questions of repetitious and immaterial matter. The gist of the charge set forth in the order is that the conduct of the trial was unduly delayed by the acts of petitioner and that his actions and conduct constituted an attempt to prevent the defendant from having a fair trial.

It appears from the petition for the writ herein, the allegations of which are not denied, that the trial of the action began on June 14, 1950; that on the 16th day of June the trial judge, at his own instance, continued the matter to June 19th at 2 o’clock p. m.; the trial proceeded from 2 o’clock p. m. to 4:30 p. m. on that date and was continued by the trial judge to June 21st, without request of counsel for either of the parties. The trial was resumed at 2 o’clock on June 21st and continued throughout that day. The following day it was again continued by the trial judge to June 26th and the taking of evidence was concluded on June 27th; that the court was always recessed .by the trial judge at 4:30 p. m. each afternoon and on a few occasions before that time; that on many occasions the recesses in the morning and afternoon sessions extended for longer than 10 minutes; that many witnesses were produced and testified upon behalf of plaintiff and defendant; that the examination of the witnesses was very lengthy and repetitious and consumed a great deal of time; that the trial court “took off” two full days during the trial of said cause and the court was not always convened promptly at the morning or afternoon sessions; that different persons came frequently to see the trial judge and the trial of the case was either not begun or delayed while matters were being discussed with the trial judge.