Mantzoros v. State Board of Equalization

DOOLING, J. In these two cases (consolidated on appeal for briefs, arguments and decision) the State Board of Equalization appeals from two orders directing the issuance of peremptory writs of mandate.

The order in the Wilkinson case directs the board and its members to refrain from imposing any sentence, suspension or penalty on petitioners. The petition shows that on December 12, 1946, the board made an order suspending petitioner’s license for 15 days because of violation of section 59.6 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act [Stats. 1945, p. 1474 ; 2 DBering’s Gen. Laws, Act 3796] by serving persons on the licensed premises on August 28, 1946, at the hour of 1:30 a. m. In the Mantzoros case the board adopted a proposed decision proposing 15 days’ suspension for violation of section 59.6 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act because one of respondents’ employees, acting within the course of employment, had sold a bottle of whiskey to a patron in the licensed premises on May 23, 1946, at the hour of 10:10 p. m. The principal ques[142]tion argued is whether section 59.6 was still in force at the time of the two alleged violations.

Section 59.6 (Stats. .1945, p. 1474) contains the following duration clause:

“This section shall remain in effect until the ninety-first day after final adjournment of the Fifty-seventh Regular Session of the Legislature or until six months after the cessation of hostilities in all wars in which the United States is now engaged, whichever first occurs. ’ ’ The italicized language is that in question.

The principal question presented on these appeals is whether the words “cessation of hostilities” should be interpreted to refer to the date upon which all active fighting in the wars referred to actually ended or the date when the President of the United States of America formally declared that all hostilities had ceased. If the latter, since the President’s formal proclamation fixed the time of the cessation of hostilities as 12 o’clock noon on December 31, 1946, section 59.6 remained in force by its terms until June 30, 1947, and the two acts which resulted in the disciplinary action here under review occurred while that section was still in force and the sales were at hours forbidden by that section. On the other hand if section 59.6 was no longer in effect when these two sales were made the general law which was temporarily superseded by section 59.6 did not forbid them.