National Electric Welding Machines Co. v. Glick

MOORE, P. J. The question for decision is whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence.

Respondent sued appellants (1) for a balance of $7,930 due on account of certain machines sold to appellants and (2) upon an account stated in the same sum. Appellants having admitted by their answer the alleged purchase, sought by their cross-complaint damages in the sum of $400,000 for breach of warranty on account of the alleged defectiveness [33]of the machines and accessories, consisting of a mat welder, a tee welder and a gun welder, which appellants purchased for the purpose of manufacturing grating although they had been constructed for the purpose of welding airfield landing mats. The findings and judgment were in favor of respondent (1) on its account stated and (2) against appellants on their cross-complaint. The latter demand a reversal of the judgment on the ground that their evidence in support of the cross-action met with no substantial conflict.

Appellants have outlined with meticulous care the several particulars with respect to which the warranties were breached, and have quoted testimony and documentary proofs in support of their contentions. Such labor is presumptively a duplication of the effort made before the trial court. Arguments upon the weight of evidence under our system of procedure have no place before a reviewing court except in those eases where there is either an utter lack of evidential support for the judgment or where the proof is so slight that to base a judgment thereon would be an abuse of discretion. Such is not the situation here. On the contrary, on the issues of the breaches of warranty respondent introduced substantial evidence which was adopted by the trial court. No advantage could be gained by a recital of the proofs introduced by the respective parties or by inscribing in these pages the total evidence in rebuttal of that which was favorable to appellants.

Suffice it to say that respondent established that at the time of appellants’ purchase of the machines with which they purposed to make grating, respondent’s agents stated that they could be put to such use with necessary changes; that specifications for the conversion of the mat welder to a grating welder would be prepared by respondent but that the labor should be performed by appellants at their own expense. Respondent’s Los Angeles manager testified that designs for the making of the mat welder into a grating welder were delivered to appellants. The welder was set up by appellants in their Los Angeles factory in May, 1942, and for some time so performed as to demonstrate all of the capabilities promised by respondent in the manufacture of ship grating. With reference to a number of the alleged defects which appellants claimed to have developed in that period, the testimony of respondent’s witnesses was to the effect that they were due to inexperienced workmanship in reassembling the machine and not to its inefficiency as