In re Trombley

GOODELL, J. This is a proceeding in habeas corpus. A complaint was filed in the Justices’ Court of Township Fifteen, Contra Costa County, accusing the petitioner in five counts of five violations of the Labor Code. Four counts [529]charged failure to pay wages to four employees (Lab. Code, §§ 202, 216) and the other charged a failure to maintain semimonthly pay days (§204), and a failure to post notices thereof (§ 207).

Petitioner pleaded not guilty and was tried by jury. He was convicted on four counts (one having been dismissed by the district attorney) and sentenced. On appeal the superior court affirmed the judgment and the order denying a new trial. Petitioner then commenced this proceeding.

It is hardly necessary to say that the scope of the inquiry in a proceeding such as this, after the judgment of conviction has become final on appeal, is extremely limited. The petitioner, however, attacks the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, and habeas corpus is available for súch attack after final judgment. (In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 495 [122 P.2d 22].)

The attack is based on section 15 of article I of the state Constitution which reads: “No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud, ...”

The original labor law (Stats. 1911, pp. 1268-9) was under attack in In re Crane, 26 Cal.App. 22 [145 P. 733], where it was held that the arrest of Crane on mesne process was violative of the constitutional provision. To replace the 1911 law the statute of 1919, page 294 was enacted, section 6 of which read substantially as section 216 of the Labor Code now reads.

The 1919 act was .held to be constitutional in In re Oswald, 76 Cal.App. 347 [244 P. 940], In re Samaha, 130 Cal.App. 116 [19 P.2d 839], Sears v. Superior Court, 133 Cal.App. 704 [24 P.2d 842] and In re Sears, 137 Cal.App. 308 [30 P.2d 571], See, also, In re Moffett, 19 Cal.App.2d 7, 17 [64 P.2d 1190].

By statute of 1937, page 185, the 1919 law was repealed (p. 327) and the present law enacted (pp. 197, 199) and codified in section 202 of the Labor Code which reads:

“If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his employment, his wages shall become due and payable not later than seventy-two hours thereafter, unless the employee has given seventy-two hours previous notice of his intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his wages at the time of quitting. ’ ’