People v. Engelhart

NOURSE, P. J. In a trial to a jury the defendant was convicted for a violation of the Insurance Code in presenting a false claim for insurance upon a quantity of liquor claimed to have been stolen. He appeals from the judgment and from the order denying his motion for a new trial. The defendant with two partners owned and operated a tavern in San Francisco known as the Camel Club. On the evening of February 21, 1945, the two other partners left the club at about 11:30 p. m.; defendant was then attending the bar and was in full possession of the premises. He left at about 12:30 and went' to the home of one of the partners. There they received a telephone call telling them that the club [7]had been burglarized. A few days later defendant and one of the partners made out an inventory and proof of loss which defendant signed and delivered to the agent of the insurance company.

On March 12,1945, defendant went to the home of his sister-in-law where he stayed through the night. The following morning three police officers went to these premises. The defendant, who had spent the night on a bed in the living room, opened the door for the officers. He was very drunk and could not recall the conversations he had with the officers. One of them asked: “Where is all this whiskey that is supposed to be here ? ’ ’ The defendant let the officers in and went back to bed. He could not recall what answer he gave to the question about the liquor. The officers searched the premises and found twenty-five full eases and one opened case of liquor admittedly taken from the Camel Club. Three empty bottles taken from the opened case were found in the kitchen. Later fourteen more cases were found in the garage. After the liquor was found on March 13, the defendant was taken into custody. One of the partners was called to the premises; the defendant and other occupants were questioned, but all denied any knowledge of the presence of the liquor on the premises. While defendant was being transported to the police headquarters he said to his partner: “I wonder who fingered the place to the cops.”

The only ground urged on the appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. It is conceded that there is no direct evidence that appellant was a party to the taking of the liquor, or to the storing of it in the premises of his sister-in-law, or of the knowledge that it was so stored when he filed the claim with the insurance company. It was not necessary for the State to prove more than that he filed a false claim of loss. To supply this proof the respondent relies upon the circumstantial evidence and the inference of knowledge arising from these circumstances. The question of law confronting us is whether, when guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged, such knowledge may be inferred from the facts proved.