People v. MacFarlane

YORK, P. J. In an action brought to enjoin defendants and to abate a nuisance, judgment was rendered in favor of defendants, who within the time allowed by law served and filed their memorandum of costs and disbursements for notary’s fees, witnesses’ fees and mileage amounting to $148.60. Thereafter, plaintiff served and filed its notice of motion to tax costs, which was aimed at striking from defendants’ cost bill certain items of mileage claimed for witnesses for consecutive days of attendance in court, thereby effecting a reduction of $16.60 in said costs.

When the matter came on for hearing, plaintiff took the [536]position that a witness in attendance on the court on consecutive days is not entitled to mileage for each day’s attendance under the provisions of section 4300g of the Political Code which reads:

“Witness’ fees . . . For each day’s actual attendance, when legally required to attend upon the superior court, per day, two dollars in civil cases . . . Mileage actually traveled, one way only, per mile, ten cents. ...”

This appeal is prosecuted by defendants from the order of the trial court retaxing costs in accordance with plaintiff’s motion, and is presented upon an “engrossed settled statement in lieu of both transcripts on appeal.”

Appellants urge that section 4300g, Political Code, supra, makes “no provision or distinction between consecutive days or non-conseeutive days in allowing witness’ fees and mileage for each day’s attendance in court, and the prevailing party is therefore entitled to charge mileage actually traveled as well as witness’ fees for each day’s actual attendance in court of his witnesses whether for consecutive days of attendance or not ... A witness acting in good faith in attending court should be entitled to have and receive the fees and mileage provided for him by law.”

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that since “the statute makes no reference at all to daily repetitions of travel . . . the legislature did not contemplate daily trips to and from court and home . . . and if the witness made visits to his home during the period of his attendance as a witness, such visits must be deemed to have been made for his own convenience, comfort or economy, or to attend to his own private affairs.”

No authorities .are cited which pass upon the particular point here raised, although respondent calls attention to the fact that fifty years ago, “the District Attorney of Los Angeles County transmitted his opinion to the County Clerk of Los Angeles County, construing the provisions of said 1895 Act pertaining to mileage for jurors, as covering the payment of mileage only for nonconsecutive days of attendance. That construction and practice has been consistently and continuously followed since. The gist of this opinion is that on intervening days, when the juror would not be attending court, and consequently not receiving his per diem, the juror would be entitled to return to his home, and in coming back to court he would be entitled to mileage again.