Tetze v. Tetze

McCOMB, J. From a judgment in favor of defendants after trial before the court without jury, in an action to quiet title to personal property, plaintiff appeals.

The evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to defendants (respondents), and pursuant to the rules set forth in Estate of Isenberg, 63 Cal.App.2d 214, 216 et seq. [146 P.2d 424], the essential facts are:

Plaintiff was the mother and defendant Joan Tetze (hereinafter referred to as defendant) was the wife of Alexander Tetze, who died on March 23, 1942. In October or November of 1936, plaintiff gave to her son and defendant certain household furniture described in count one of the complaint. Plaintiff asserts ownership to these movables and alleges a loan thereof to decedent.

In May, 1927, Mr. Tetze purchased a service station described in count two of the complaint. Decedent never parted with title to such property but in May, 1927, he gave plaintiff a bill of sale covering the service station above-mentioned telling plaintiff to put the paper away among her “private papers ’ ’ and stated to her, ‘ ‘If anything happens to me this station will be yours.”

July 29, 1934, Mr. Tetze married defendant.

In 1941, Mr. Tetze placed a chattel mortgage on the service station, which mortgage was signed by defendant. Plaintiff did not at any time have possession of the service station, nor did defendant know until her husband’s death that he had given plaintiff a bill of sale to the service station. The service station was operated at all times from the time defendant married Mr. Tetze until his death as the property of Mr. Tetze.

Defendant is the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband and the sole devisee under his will.

Plaintiff relies for reversal of the judgment on three propositions which will be stated and answered hereunder seriatim:

First: There is not any substantial evidence to sustain the trial court’s findings that (a) defendant is the owner and entitled to the possession of the personal property described in count one of the complaint; (b) plaintiff is not the owner of the service station described in count two of the complaint; and (c) defendant is the owner of the service station described in count two of the complaint.

This proposition is untenable.

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