Miller v. Miller

MOORE, P. J. The question for decision is whether the findings have substantial evidentiary support.

On September 7,1943, respondent obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from appellant with whom she had lived in conjugal amity for some years. Following the entry of that decree appellant instituted this action against her for declaratory relief, claiming that the home in Compton in which the parties had maintained their abode was owned by them as joint tenants and that he had voluntarily recorded an assignment of his interest therein solely for his wife’s protection in the event of his death in the course of military training. Also, he alleged that he had endorsed in blank his certificate of ownership of a Studebaker automobile and left it among his papers and that without his consent respondent had appropriated it, had inserted her name as assignee and had caused title thereto to be transferred to herself. Wherefore, he demanded to be restored to ownership.

Following a trial the court made findings as follows: On June 29, 1940, the parties contracted for the purchase of [753]the Compton property as joint tenants for which they held a sales agreement from the Ed Krist Company without a notarial acknowledgment; prior to April 15, 1942, appellant informed respondent of his intention to assign to her his interest in the realty and subsequently advised her that he had made such assignment; plaintiff terminated his interest in the property by assigning the contract to respondent and pursuant to his request she accepted the assignment and recorded the instrument; November 27, 1941, the parties purchased with community funds a Studebaker car, the title to which was taken in the name of appellant but with the intention of both that it should remain community in character; on August 15, 1942, appellant indorsed the ownership certificate, delivered it to respondent and advised her that he was thereby assigning his interest in the vehicle to her; one week later, with respondent’s knowledge, appellant moved to the State of Arizona. The court determined also that it was not true that appellant instructed his wife that in the event of his decease as a result of hazardous war training she could have the automobile, but that appellant made a voluntary gift of the vehicle to respondent. Upon such findings the court decreed that both the Compton property and the automobile were community property from the date of purchase of same by appellant until the transfer of his interest therein to respondent, after which the property was her separate estate.