Smith v. Williams

California Court of Appeal Oct 26, 1944 No. Civ. No. 3278Published

Before: Barnard

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Holding. The court held that prior probate court orders authorizing trustees to encumber real property were res judicata, precluding remaindermen from relitigating the trustees' authority or the interpretation of the will in a subsequent partition action.

Issues

Whether the probate court's prior orders authorizing the trustees to borrow money and encumber real property are res judicata against the remaindermen.
Whether the testamentary trust granted the trustees the power to encumber real property for the support and comfort of the life beneficiary.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, the order of the court, whether correct or not, became res judicata on the issue of power to sell.”

“Not only had those previous orders, whether correct or not, become res judicata on this issue but no error in connection with the decision in the present action appears on the face of the judgment roll.”

BARNARD, P. J. This is an appeal from that portion of a judgment which upholds the validity of a trust deed upon certain real property.

Lisbon Williams died in 1919, leaving at least the use of all of his estate to his sister Sarah E. Merrill for her lifetime, appointing his said sister and a brother F. E. Williams as trustees to carry out the full intent and purpose of his will, and giving some sort of a remainder to seven named nephews and nieces. The same sister and brother were appointed executors of the will.

The will was probated in Orange County and in 1926 a decree of distribution was entered distributing the estate as follows:

“ (1) The whole thereof to the said Sarah E. Merrill, sister of said decedent, to have and to hold for her use and benefit and to enjoy and use the rents, income and profit thereof, during her natural life only, subject to and impressed with the trust provisions hereinafter provided for;

“ (2) To the said F. E. Williams and Sarah E. Merrill, as Trustees, during the natural life of said Sarah E. Merrill, all the property of said estate, both real and personal, in trust nevertheless, upon the uses and trusts hereinafter named and not otherwise:— The said Trustees are hereby given full and complete charge and control of all the property of said estate during the life of said Sarah E. Merrill, with power to buy and sell, rent, lease or otherwise deal with the personal property of said trust without order of Court, subject, however, at all times to confirmation and approval thereof by this Court. Said Trustees are further authorized and directed to pay to the said Sarah E. Merrill, during her natural life, from time to time out of the rents, income and profits of said property such sums as may be necessary to satisfy the just needs and make provision for the comfort of the said Sarah E. Merrill, [545]during her lifetime and said trustees shall be the sole judges, subject to the confirmation and approval of the Court, of such amounts from time to time necessary therefor. All sales and other conduct of the Trustees from time to time in the administration of said trust, shall be subject to the approval and confirmation of this Court. . . .

“ (3) The whole of said estate remaining after the death of said Sarah E. Merrill is hereby distributed share and share alike to the following persons;” (naming the seven nephews and nieces).

Smith v. Williams

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