Thompson v. Cook

WOOD (W. J.), J. A default judgment in the sum of $4,012.29 was entered on February 13, 1936, in favor of Leonard B. Colton and against defendants. Thereafter K. W. Thompson was substituted as plaintiff. Hereinafter the original and the substituted plaintiff will be referred to as plaintiff. At an execution sale held on August 17, 1936, the sheriff sold to plaintiff for the full amount of the judgment certain real estate situated in Glenn County and thereupon satisfied the judgment of record. An action was commenced in the Superior Court of Glenn County on June 4, 1937, by GlennColusa Irrigation District to quiet its title to the land which had been sold to plaintiff at the execution sale, plaintiff herein being named as party defendant. Plaintiff herein appeared in that action and contested the right of Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District to a decree quieting title, and on April 13, 1938, judgment was entered in favor of Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District quieting its title to the real estate involved. An order was made on June 9, 1938, granting plaintiff’s motion under section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revive the judgment herein on the ground that the real estate sold under execution sale in Glenn County was not subject to execution and sale. Defendants received written notice of the [487]order granting this motion on October 15, 1938. Defendants filed a motion on March 12, 1941, to vacate the order reviving the judgment, which motion was denied on March 17, 1941. Defendants thereupon appealed from the order denying their motion to vacate the order reviving the judgment and on July 15, 1942, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the superior court, the basis of the ruling being that defendants had not received notice of plaintiff’s motion to revive the judgment. (Thompson v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564 [127 P.2d 909].) The remittitur was received from the clerk of the Supreme Court on August 17, 1942, and on September 11, 1942, plaintiff served and filed a notice of motion to revive the judgment. From the order granting this motion, entered on February 1, 1943, defendants prosecute this appeal.

The real estate involved had stood in the name of one of the defendants, who became delinquent in the payment of assessments due the irrigation district. The property had been deeded to Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District by collector’s deeds issued on September 5, 1935, recorded in the official records of Glenn County on September 12, 1935, which were based on a certificate of sale issued in October, 1932. A second set of deeds was obtained by Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District on August 22, 1936, five days after the execution sale. Defendants contend that the last mentioned deeds were the only valid ones and that there was a period of five days between the execution sale and the delivery of the deeds in which the property sold under execution could have been redeemed. Plaintiff contends that the deeds issued prior to the execution sale to Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District were valid and that defendants had no title to or interest in the real estate in question on the date of the execution sale.