Yetta C. Manoil, Inc. v. Gibson

McCOMB, J. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff after trial before the court without a jury in an unlawful detainer action for the purpose of recovering the immediate possession of a three-story building, on the ground that the lessee had violated the terms of a lease, defendant lessee appeals.

There are also appeals from orders denying defendant lessee’s:

(1) Motion for an order under section 1179, Code of Civil Procedure, and

(2) Motion for a new trial.

The evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff (respondent), the essential facts are these:

October 1, 1941, plaintiff as lessor leased to defendant, Cecil E. Gibson, a three-story concrete building in Los Angeles known as 1017 North Alameda Street and 720 North Spring Street. The building is a garage building consisting of three floors. There is a separate entrance to the second floor from Spring Street, there being no direct connection between the first and second floor other than by a freight elevator, which can be operated between all three floors in the building.

It was provided in the lease that, “Except with the written consent of Landlord, only Tenant shall occupy the demised premises; and neither the demised premises, nor any part thereof, shall be sublet, nor shall this lease be assigned by Tenant voluntarily or involuntarily by operation of law. ’ ’

In December, 1941, defendant lessee sublet the entire second floor of the building to Transport Motor Company for a monthfy rental of $200 payable in advance. Plaintiff lessor never gave his consent to the sublease.

This is the sole question necessary for us to determine:

Was there substantial evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that defendant lessee, contrary to the provisions of the lease, sublet a portion of the demised premises without the consent of plaintiff lessor ?

This question must be answered in the affirmative. It is undisputed that the written lease between the parties contained a provision prohibiting the subletting of the leased premises or any portion thereof without written consent of the lessor. It is likewise conceded that the lessor did not at [622]any time consent to a subletting of any portion or all of the leased property.