Meadows v. Hampton Live Stock Commission Co.

WOOD (W. J.), J. Plaintiff commenced this action for the alleged conversion of 63 head of cattle. Judgment was rendered against defendant Merchants Packing Company in the sum of $2,276.10, and against defendant Coast Packing Company in the sum of $2,767.70. These two defendants, who will hereinafter be referred to as defendants, have appealed from the judgment.

Plaintiff sold the cattle in question at his ranch to defendant Hampton Live Stock Commission Company on December 29, 1940, for the sum of $4,536.23. At the time of the sale he knew that the Hampton Company was engaged in the business of buying and selling live stock at Los Angeles Union Stock Yards and that the Hampton Company intended to and would display the cattle for sale at the stock yards. Plaintiff went to the stock yards and was personally present when the cattle were unloaded and “weighed in.” He delivered to the representative of the Hampton Company a brand inspection slip as required by section 366 of the Agricultural Code of California. In this slip the cattle were identified and plaintiff was designated as seller and the Hampton Company as purchaser. Each of the defendants purchased a portion of the shipment of cattle on December 30, 1940, in the usual course of business at the stock yards without the knowledge of any defect in the title of the Hampton Company, and paid to the Hampton Company the purchase price of $5,043.70 for the cattle. Judgment was entered against them for this sum.

Plaintiff testified that when the cattle were being “weighed in” he received drafts in payment for them from the Hamp[636]ton Company but that he refused to give a bill of sale for the cattle until he had the money. The drafts were presented for payment on December 30, 1940, but were dishonored. Plaintiff thereupon complained to the Hampton Company and received a cheek in the sum of $4,536.23 but this check was also dishonored. The trial court found that plaintiff did not give to any of the defendants a written bill of sale for the cattle, reciting the kind and brands and signed by plaintiff and two subscribing witnesses who had been freeholders of the county for at least two years. Judgment was given to plaintiff because of the absence of such a bill of sale.

At the trial it was conceded that defendants purchased the cattle in good faith and that “they hadn’t any idea that there was anything wrong with the title. ’ ’ Since plaintiff delivered possession of the cattle to a concern engaged in the business of selling cattle at public stock yards, together with a brand inspection slip, saw the cattle unloaded and knew that they would be offered for sale to others, he unquestionably entrusted the Hampton Company with the indicia of ownership. The owner of property who clothes another with the apparent title to it, or the power of disposition of it, is estopped from afterwards asserting his title against an innocent third party who has thereby been induced to deal with the apparent owner in reference thereto. (Wendling Lbr. Co. v. Glenwood Lbr. Co., 54 Cal.App. 691 [202 P. 929] ; Pacific Finance Corp. v. Hendley, 103 Cal.App. 335 [284 P. 736].) One who stands by while property to which he has title is sold is estopped from setting up title against the purchaser. (Snodgrass v. Ricketts, 13 Cal. 359.) Plaintiff asserts that estoppel was not pleaded and that for this reason defendants are not in position to contend that he was es-topped from asserting his title. It is true that the word, estoppel, is not used in the pleadings but it is not necessary that an estoppel be pleaded by name. It is sufficient if the facts be set forth in the pleadings in such manner as to bring the issue before the court. From the complaint and the answer it is apparent that all of the essential facts to establish an estoppel were pleaded. Moreover, defendants are protected by the rule set forth in section 3543 of the Civil Code: “Where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it happened, must be the