Williams v. Ryan

PETERS, P. J. Plaintiff brought this action for declaratory relief for the purpose of having determined her rights under a contract dated May 10, 1930, by which defendant Harry Ryan sold to plaintiff a parcel of real property for the sum of $850. Defendant Harry Ryan and his wife, who was joined as a codefendant, by their answer and amended cross-complaint admitted the execution of the contract, but alleged that under the terms thereof there was due and owing on the purchase price, plus interest, and taxes, $1,267.07, and, further, that defendants were entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee of $250, for which judgment was asked. After a trial before the court without a jury, the court determined that $695 was due on the purchase price, $374.49 as interest, $35.96 for taxes and $250 as attorney’s fees, and rendered its judgment in favor of defendant in the amount of $1,355.45. Prom that judgment plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.

The evidence shows that defendant Harry Ryan owns a subdivision in the Santa Cruz Mountains known as Mountain Springs. On May 10, 1930, Ryan entered into a contract with plaintiff, which is a form contract prepared by Ryan, by the terms of which he agreed to sell to plaintiff an unimproved lot in that subdivision for $850, $100 on execution of the agreement “receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,” [191]the balance payable in monthly installments of $15 each, payable on the 10th day of each month starting June 10, 1930, with 7 per cent interest on the unpaid balance. The buyer agreed to pay all taxes. The form provides that the agreement is “subject to” certain “conditions, restrictions and reservations,” among which are that the seller reserves all water rights, and that the “title to each lot in Mountain Springs carries with it one share of stock in the Mountain Springs Water Association. A charge of Ten ($10.00) Dollars will be made for water connection from street main to property line. Water will be piped for household purposes only”; that the buyer is entitled to immediate possession; that in the event “suit is commenced by the Seller against the Buyer for any cause arising out of this agreement, the Buyer hereby promise [s] to pay to the Seller a reasonable attorney’s fee ...”

There is no dispute that, when this contract was entered into, Ryan knew that plaintiff intended to build a house on the property, and that the property was purchased for that purpose. Plaintiff took possession and immediately started construction of a log cabin. She testified that over a period of time she expended between $2,200 and $2,500 on improving the property, defendant admitting that he had assisted in several respects in the construction of the house. Over a period of time the plaintiff paid to defendant $155 in installments on the purchase price, the last payment being made on December' 31, 1931. Although the contract acknowledged receipt of $100 upon the execution of the agreement, it is admitted that such sum was not then paid, plaintiff testifying that she gave a promissory note in that sum to Ryan in lieu of the cash. Plaintiff testified the note had been paid by her husband. Defendant denied the note had been paid and produced the uncancelled note. The trial court found it had not been paid. That finding is supported by the evidence.