Pease v. San Diego Unified School District

BARNARD, P. J. This is an action for damages on account of injuries received hy the plaintiff on May 7, 1941, as the result of a fall on an arcade walk between the main school building and the school auditorium on the San Diego High School grounds.

[22]On this occasion the Salvation Army had rented the auditorium for an evening meeting. It had also secured from the defendant Stoll certain equipment for a public address system which was installed for use on this evening. As a part thereof a loud speaker was set up in front of the auditorium and connected with the rest of the system by laying an insulated wire on the ground, across this arcade walk, along the side of the building, and thence into the auditorium. The plaintiff, who had gone to the main school building in connection with the night school which was being held there, caught her foot on this wire as she was leaving and while passing over the arcade walk on her way to the street. There is evidence that the lights over this arcade walk near the place in question were not turned on at the time of the accident.

The plaintiff brought this action against the school district, Stoll, and the Salvation Army. The court directed a verdict in favor of the school district and a judgment in favor of that defendant has become final. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,000, as against Stoll and the Salvation Army. The Salvation Army moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which motion was granted, and the plaintiff has appealed from the judgment then entered in favor of that defendant.

While there is some contention that no act of negligence appears, the evidence, while conflicting, is sufficient to sustain the implied finding that this wire was laid across this walk in a negligent manner. The main controversy here is ■ as to whether or not the person who placed the wire in that position was an agent or employee of this respondent. Respondent contends that Stoll was an independent contractor;' that he was in charge of the installation of this equipment; and that the respondent had nothing to do therewith.

There is evidence that some days before this meeting was to be held the secretary of respondent’s advisory board, which was in charge of the arrangement for the meeting, telephoned to Stoll, who was in the business of supplying sound equipment for temporary use, with reference to having such equipment furnished on this occasion. Stoll testified that he told the person who telephoned that the price would be $15 with an extra charge of $2.50' if an additional loud speaker was desired on the outside of the building, and that he told this person that this price “doesn’t cover the cost of the installation, it doesn’t cover the installation because that