Sloss v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
Before: McComb
McCOMB, J. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff after trial by jury in an action to recover damages for conversion of an automobile, defendant General Motors Acceptance Corp. appeals.
The evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff (respondent) the essential facts are:
April 12, 1940, plaintiff was employed by a Mr. Clifford T. Nutt, a Buiek automobile dealer, as a salesman. Plaintiff entered into a conditional sales contract with Mr. Nutt, whereby he agreed to purchase a 1940 Buick automobile to use as a demonstrator. The down payment of $311.19 represented an approximate discount of $200 and about $100 cash paid by plaintiff. The balance was to be paid in installments of approximately $35 per month. Two installments of $35 each were paid by plaintiff.
In connection with the execution of the conditional sales contract, plaintiff executed and delivered to Mr. Nutt a supplemental agreement which provided in effect that, in the event of the termination of his employment, voluntarily or involuntarily, the full amount outstanding on the conditional sales contract should become automatically due and payable. Immediately after they were executed, the conditional sales contract and supplemental agreement were sold, assigned and transferred for a valuable consideration to defendant General Motors Acceptance ■Corporation.
July 10, 1940, said defendant through its agent entered the place of business of Mr. Nutt, the conditional vendor heretofore mentioned, and repossessed all of the automobiles in his place of business by reason of appropriate documents which it held. July 11, 1940, at about 8:15 a. m., said defendant through its agent demanded of plaintiff the balance due on his conditional sales contract or the possession of his automobile. Plaintiff refused to comply with either alternative, at which time defendant’s agent stated that he must have the car [577]by 5:00 o ’clock or he would swear out a warrant against plaintiff for concealing property. About 5:00 o ’clock of the same day plaintiff delivered the automobile which was the subject of the conditional sales contract to defendant’s employee. Thereafter said defendant offered to return to plaintiff the automobile but plaintiff refused to accept it.
Said defendant relies for reversal of the judgment on these propositions:
First: The evidence is insufficient to support the following findings of fact:
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