People v. Schmidt

SPENCE, J. Plaintiff sued to recover from defendant license fees of $250 and $500 respectively, alleged to have become due from defendant by reason of the issuance to defendant of two beer importer’s licenses under the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 1935. (Stats. 1935, Chap. 330, Deering’s Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 3796.) Plaintiff had judgment and defendant appeals.

[257]Shortly after said act became effective, certain interested parties commenced an action entitled Young’s Market Co., et al. v. State Board of Equalization et al., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, said action being numbered therein Equity 736-H. A court of three judges heard said cause and a judgment was entered permanently enjoining the defendants therein from enforcing against plaintiffs therein and others similarly situated certain provisions of said act including the provisions thereof relating to the collection of beer importer’s license fees. (See Young’s Market Co. et al. v. State Board of Equalization et al., 12 Fed. Supp. 140.) Said judgment was thereafter reversed by the United States Supreme Court. (State Board of Equalization et al. v. Young’s Market Co. et al., 299 U. S. 59 [57 Sup. Ct. 77, 81 L. Ed. 38].)

After the entry of the judgment in that ease but prior to the reversal of said judgment, a beer importer’s license was issued to defendant bearing the following typewritten notation upon the face thereof: “This license issued without fee provided for in Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, in accordance with decree recorded and entered on October 9, 1935 in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, Central Division, in the cause entitled ‘Young’s Market Company, a Corporation, et al. v. State Board of Equalization of the State of California, et al., No. Eq. 736-H.’ ” Thereafter, and prior to the reversal of said judgment, said license was renewed without the payment of the fee provided in said act. After said judgment was reversed in December, 1936, demand was then made upon defendant to pay the fees provided in said act for said licenses which had been previously issued. Defendant refused to pay said fees and this action was commenced for the purpose of collecting the same. The evidence showed that defendant had made extensive importations of beer under said licenses prior to the demand for said fees but had ceased to make said importations after the demand for said fees.

Defendant makes several contentions but all are to the effect that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to the complaint and in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff. We do not believe that defendant’s contentions can be sustained.