Hasty v. G. T. Marsh & Co.
Before: Sturtevant
STURTEVANT, J. On December 22, 1936, C. Albert Hasty, a boy eight years of age, was riding in a school bus going from his home to Charing Cross school. The bus was traveling along Hyde Street in a southerly direction toward [435]Post Street. At about the same time George R. Marsh was driving a light Ford truck which was proceeding easterly on Post Street. In the intersection of those two streets a collision occurred and C. Albert Hasty was badly injured. His father, acting as guardian ad litem, commenced this action to recover damages. The jury returned a verdict awarding the minor damages in the sum of $5,000 and awarding his father damages in the sum of $1,019. From the judgment entered on the verdict the defendants G. T. Marsh & Company, a corporation, and George R. Marsh appeal. The defendants claim the trial court erred in instructing the jury and that the award of $5,000 in favor of the minor was excessive. Those two points will be discussed in the order stated.
As to the first point the defendants state that the question involved is as follows: Is it error to instruct the jury, that the operation of an automobile at a speed which exceeds the limits specified in the law is prima facie unlawful, and yet to leave the jury to guess what limits of speed are so specified? The plaintiffs contend that the question as stated is not involved in the record. In making that contention we think the plaintiffs’ position is fully sustained by the record. The defendants’ contention is based on the following facts: They asked an instruction that was worded as follows: (Lettering and parentheses ours.)
“ (a) The Motor Vehicle Code sets forth what is there termed a basic speed law, which reads as follows:
“ ‘No persons shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property. ’
“(b) The Code then sets out what are termed prima facie speed limits. That provision reads in part as follows:
“ ‘The speed of any vehicle upon a highway not in excess of the limits specified in this section is lawful unless clearly proved to be in violation of the basic rule declared in Section 510 hereof, ’ which is the section I have just read to you. “(c) The Motor Vehicle Code then proceeds as follows:
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