Cole v. Riley

ROTH, J., pro tem. This appeal involves the construction of section 609 of the Probate Code prior to its amendment in 1933. It then read as follows: “Compensation of appraisers. Each appraiser is entitled to receive, from each estate he appraises, his actual and necessary expenses and compensation for his services not to exceed five dollars per day, to be allowed by the court; and he must file with the inventory, a verified account of his services and disbursements.”

The respondents Merrick and Riley claim that they devoted 118 and 116 days, respectively, to the work of appraising the estate here involved. The record shows nothing in so far as the particularized services of respondent Del Porte are concerned. The bill of exceptions shows that neither of the respondents Merrick or Riley devoted full days to their duties as appraisers. In this connection Merrick testified in substance as follows: “ ... I did not devote my time exclusively to the appraisal of the assets of said estate on those days. I carried on my regular work of appraising and as real estate broker on those days, answering the telephone, carrying on correspondence and interviewing clients. For [671]example, on the third of March, 1932, my work consisted-of approximately an hour’s conference at the office of Jack Riley. My work in appraising the estate varied from one hour to a full day’s work.”

Riley admitted in substance: “During said 116 days I carried on my regular office work and on such days made appraisals on other estates for which I charged and received a full day’s fee.”

In a petition to have the fees of appraisers fixed, appellant alleged, among other things: “ . . . petitioner is informed and believes . . . that said compensation claimed is excessive and that said appraisers were not actually engaged in the appraising of said estate for one hundred days and that not to exceed ten days were actually expended by said appraisers in appraising said estate.” Exceptions were filed by respondents to this petition, and the court after hearing the evidence acted upon the petition and the exceptions thereto, and made its order allowing $510.50 to Merrick, $517.50 to Riley, and $351 to Del Porte. The appeal is from that order, and involves, as above stated, the construction of the aforesaid code section which, so far as we have been advised, has never been construed.

The statute, except as to the meaning of a “day”, is, in our opinion, bluntly clear on its face. It provides that an appraiser is to receive “for his services not to exceed five dollars per day”. (Italics ours.) A day is defined by section 3259 of the Political Code: “A day is the period of time between any midnight and the midnight following.” (City of Eureka v. Diaz, 89 Cal. 467 [26 Pac. 961]; Hunt v. Hammel, 142 Cal. 456 [76 Pac. 378]; Cosgriff v. Election Commissioners, 151 Cal. 407 [91 Pac. 98].) It is apparent to us that the legislature, when it enacted the statute under construction, did not mean that an appraiser would have to work from midnight to midnight in order to perform a day’s service and earn “not to exceed five dollars”. It is equally apparent to us that the legislature did not mean that five minutes’ work or an hour of one’s time was equivalent to a day. Laws must be construed with reference to their purpose and the object intended to be accomplished, and if susceptible of two interpretations, that one will be adopted which renders it fair and harmonious for the purpose intended. (Goldsmith v. Board of Education, 66 Cal. App.