Williams v. Superior Court

KNIGHT, J. Pursuant to a writ of attachment issued out of the Justice’s Court of Brooklyn Township in Alameda County in an action brought by A. S. Dawning against L. C. Chambers to recover on a promissory note, the sheriff of said county seized an automobile of which the petitioner herein, Rozelle L. Williams, claimed to be the owner. Thereafter and in conformity with the provisions of section 689 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the latter served upon the sheriff a verified third party claim to the automobile, and the sheriff exacted from Downing an indemnifying undertaking in a sum equal to double the value of the property levied upon. Downing then petitioned the justice’s court as provided in said code section to hear and determine the question of title to the automobile. Such a hearing was had at which all parties interested were present, and thereafter, Chambers having defaulted, the justice’s court rendered its judgment declaring Chambers to be the owner of the automobile, and that Downing, the plaintiff in the action, do have and recover from Chambers, the amount sued for on said promissory note. Mrs. Williams took an appeal to the superior court on questions of both law and fact, which Downing moved to dismiss; and on April 4, 1935, the motion was denied. About a week later, however, the respondent superior court of its own motion made an ex parte order vacating its previous order and granted said motion. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed. ■Thereupon petitioner instituted the present proceeding in mandamus to compel the superior court to set aside its order of dismissal and to hear and determine the appeal.

[316]We are of the opinion that, petitioner was entitled io maintain the appeal. Section 974 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “Any party dissatisfied with the judgment rendered in a civil action in a . . . justice’s court, may appeal therefrom to the superior court . . . The notice [of appeal] must state whether the appeal is taken from the whole or a part of the judgment, and if from a part, what part, and whether the appeal is taken on questions of law or fact or both.” In the final judgment rendered in the present action the justice’s court adjudged, among other things, that the property “described in the 3rd party claim of Mrs. Rozelle L. Williams was the property of L. C. Chambers, defendant”, thereby making petitioner a party to the judgment, which by its terms adversely affected the title to property of which she claimed to be the owner; and that being so, her status, in our opinion, fell within the meaning of the opening clause of said section 974, granting to “Any party dissatisfied with the judgment” a right of appeal therefrom.