Beaumond v. Prudential Insurance

EDMONDS, J., pro tem. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of nonsuit in an action upon a policy of industrial life insurance.

Egnacio Glory, a Filipino, insured his life under two policies issued by the defendant company payable “to the executors or administrators of the Insured immediately upon receipt of due proof of the prior death of the Insured during the continuance of this policy, unless payment be made under the provisions of the next succeeding paragraph.” This latter provision is known as the facility of payment clause.

Some time after the issuance of the policies Glory took plaintiff Beaumond to the office of the company and told the agent that he wanted to make her the beneficiary of his life insurance. The agent thereupon gave him two blanks which he signed in the presence of the agent and Miss Beaumond. Each of them was in identical form except as to policy number and read as follows: “I, the undersigned, insured under Policy No. ... in the above named Company, hereby request and authorize the said Company, in event of my death prior to the death of the person next hereinafter named, to pay the amount of benefit specified in said policy to Adelaide Beaumond, my (state relationship, if any) Friend and the receipt signed by said person, or other sufficient proof of such payment, shall operate in the same manner as the receipt or proof of payment described in said policy.

“It is mutually agreed and understood, however, that nothing herein is to vary in any manner any of the provisions, agreements or conditions contained in said policy and the application therefor, especially the provision in the policy that the Company may make any payment provided for in the policy to any relative by blood or connection by marriage of the Insured, or to any other person appearing to said Company to be equitably entitled to the same, anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding.

“(Signature) Egnacio Glory.”

The insured later died as the result of an accident and $2,000.25 became due on the two policies. Miss Beaumond made claim for the proceeds, which the company refused to [634]recognize, and accordingly paid the amount to the public administrator as the administrator of the estate of the insured. Thereupon, plaintiff Beaumond brought this action, joining her coplaintiff as an assignee of an interest in the sum.

In an opinion filed herein prior to the order granting petition for rehearing, we said that the company’s defense is “that under the facility of payment clause it may pay the money to any person who comes within its provisions, and that having done so, its action is conclusive and bars an action by any other person”. In their petition for rehearing, counsel for respondent insisted that we have misunderstood their position. The true position of respondent, they say, is that payment was made, “not by virtue of the facility clause, but by virtue of the direct designation of the insured’s administrator as beneficiary, without reservation of any right to change the beneficiary.”