Richardson v. Superior Court
Before: Conrey
CONREY, P. J. In this proceeding an alternative writ of prohibition was issued, to which return has been made by demurrer, as well as by answer. Petitioner seeks to obtain a peremptory writ prohibiting respondent court from exercising jurisdiction in an action now pending in respondent court, in so far as said proposed exercise of jurisdiction relates to certain described measures of relief demanded by the plaintiff in that action. The action is entitled Morsey et al. v. Richardson, as Building and Loan Commissioner of the State of California et al., and is ease No. 360483 in said superior court.
[391]The questions presented herein are all tributary to a problem relating to the jurisdiction of the superior court; and, more particularly, to the limitations which may be found to exist, staying the exercise of judicial power, where such exercise of judicial power would interfere with administrative authority created by statute.
The superior court is a court having jurisdiction in “all civil actions and proceedings”,—with stated exceptions which have no importance in the present case. (Constitution of California, art. "VI, sec. 5.) By virtue of this provision of the Constitution, the superior court is a court of general jurisdiction in equity. “The superior courts have complete and full jurisdiction of all cases in equity, the same jurisdiction as that possessed and administered by the high court of chancery in England.” (San Joaquin etc. Co. v. Stevinson, 175 Cal. 607, 611 [166 Pac. 338].) And it will not be denied that this includes, under some conditions, authority to appoint a receiver of the property of a corporation.
The petitioner herein asks for the writ of prohibition, to prevent the respondent court from appointing a receiver of the property of a building and loan association, viz., Pacific Building & Loan Association, a corporation, in said action No. 360483, and from compelling petitioner to surrender to the receiver the said property, as respondent court threatens to do, notwithstanding the fact that, as shown by the complaint and by the complaints in intervention in said action, the petitioner Richardson is the duly qualified building and loan commissioner of the state of California, and as such commissioner is in possession of the property, business and assets of said corporation by virtue of proceedings taken in accordance with the provisions of section 9 of the “Building and Loan Commission Act” of 1911. (Stats. 1911, p. 607; amended 1911, Ex. Sess., p. 7.) Such possession was first taken by H. L. Carnahan, building and loan commissioner, in June, 1931, and his action therein was duly confirmed by the superior court of Los Angeles County, by order made pursuant to the procedure authorized by said section 9. In January, 1932, petitioner Richardson became building and loan commissioner by appointment as successor to said Carnahan, and as such successor entered into possession of the property and business of said Pacific Building &
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