Turner v. North Beach & Mission Railroad

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1868Published

Before: Crockett

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. A common carrier is liable for actual damages resulting from a servant's wrongful exclusion of a passenger, but is not liable for punitive damages for the servant's malicious or willful acts unless the carrier authorized or ratified such conduct.

Issues

Whether a railroad company is liable for punitive damages for the malicious acts of its conductor performed without the company's authorization or ratification.
Whether the damages awarded by the jury were excessive given the evidence of actual injury.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The rule is well established that the principal is liable for all actual damage resulting from the malfeasances, negligences or torts of his servant or agent in the course of his employment”

“the principal is not liable for the willful or malicious acts of his servants or agents done without the authority of the principal and not subsequently adopted by him”

Synopsis

Damages—Actual and Punitive—Liability for of Principal and Agent.— Plaintiff was ejected from a street railroad car in San Francisco, belonging to defendant, a corporation, by the Conductor of the car, at-the hour of ten o’clock at night, with some violence, but resulting in no appreciable damage to plaintiff in person or estate. Plaintiff brought action to recover damages therefor, and in complaint alleged, that defendant is a common carrier of passengers; that immediately after plaintiff entered the car, defendant, without any lawful cause, and with great force and violence, and at a place other than the usual stopping place • for leaving passengers, ejected plaintiff from the car and refused to transport her, and greatly injured her in her person. There was no express averment that the act was wantonly or maliciously done, nor of special damage. On the trial it appeared from plaintiff’s testimony that she is a person of color; that .immediately after being ejected as aforesaid, she was, on her application, conveyed on another of defendant’s cars to her place of destination. There was no proof tending to show malice or willful injury on the part of the. defendant toward the plaintiff, nor, if such conduct was exhibited by the Conductor, that defendant either prompted or was privy t.o it in advance, or approved it afterwards. Plaintiff had a verdict and judgment for seven hundred and fifty dollars damages. Meld, first, that the defendant is liable, as principal, for all actual damage resulting to plaintiff from the acts complained of, which were done by defendant’s agent, the said Conductor, said acts being within the scope of his agency, even if the Conductor had been expressly forbidden by the defendant to do said acts; second, that the defendant is not liable for the willful or malicious acts of its agent, the Conductor, done without its authority in advance or its subsequent approval ; third, that it was incumbent on plaintiff, in order to charge defendant with punitive damages for the wanton, willful, or malicious acts of its agent, the Conductor, to prove that the said acts were done by its authority, either express or implied, or were subsequently adopted as its own, and that for such punitive damages as plaintiff may be entitled to for the wanton, willful, or malicious acts of the Conductor which were not so authorized or adopted by defendant, the Conductor alone is responsible; and fifth, that upon the facts disclosed, said verdict and judgment or damages were excessive, and appear to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.

By the Court, Crockett, J. : The plaintiff sues the defendant, a corporation owning a street railroad in San Francisco, to recover damages for having been ejected from one of the passenger cars of the defendant. The complaint avers that the defendant is a common carrier of passengers along certain streets of the city; that the plaintiff went upon one of the cars of defendant for the purpose of being transported along said route, and became a passenger thereon, being ready and willing to pay the proper fare; and that immediately after entering the car, “ the said defendant, without any lawful cause, and with great force and violence, and at a place other than a usual stopping place of said defendants for leaving passengers,” ejected the plaintiff from the car, and refused to transport her on said road, and greatly injured her in her person. This is the gravamen of the offense. There is no express averment that the act was wantonly or maliciously done, nor any allegation of special damage. The answer denies all the material averments of the complaint.

On the trial it appeared that the plaintiff' is a person of color, and being examined as a witness on her own behalf, her version of the transaction was, that on the occasion referred to she hailed -one of the defendant’s cars by the usual signal; that in obedience to the signal the car stopped; that she immediately proceeded to enter the car, and had gotten upon the platform and was holding to the iron railing round it, when the Conductor put his hand on her breast, and saying to her, “ Madam, you must wait for the next car,”' broke her hold on the car with Ms hand, and pushed her off the car; that she fell backward, and stepped upon her dress [597]■with such violence as to partially tear the skirt from the body; that the transaction occurred in the evening, after dark, and that the car was only partially filled with passengers ; that after being ejected she waited a few minutes until another car of the defendant came.along, on which she took passage without objection, and was transported to her place of destination. There was no proof that she suffered any persona] injury, or was in anywise damaged otherwise than as above stated.

The Conductor on the car in question was called as a witness for the defense, and gave a somewhat different version of the affair.

He testified that on being hailed by the plaintiff he stopped the car, and when she approached sufficiently near he told her she had better wait for the next car; that she did not get near enough to take hold of the car before it moved on; that she did not get on the step or platform, and he did not lay his hand upon her, and did not then know whether she was a white or colored woman.

Turner v. North Beach & Mission Railroad

AI Brief

Synopsis

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief