Schweikert v. Seavey
Before: Chipman
Synopsis
Appeal—Conflicting Evidence.—Where the Trial Court Finds for defendant on conflicting evidence, such finding will not be disturbed on appeal, though the evidence would have justified a verdict for plaintiff.
Lease—Extension.—Plaintiff Leased Land to Defendant for a certain period, before the expiration of which plaintiff told defendant that he could have the land for another like period, the defendant agreeing to cut plaintiff’s crops as a part consideration for the extension; and subsequently plaintiff said that he would not go back on Ms word, and that, as the ground was low, and not in shape for planting, defendant “could summer-fallow it.” Part only of the land was summer-fallowed by defendant before the expiration of the original lease. Held, that the summer-fallowing of the ground was not a condition precedent to the extension of the lease, since it was a mere suggestion by plaintiff, and a matter of no concern to Mm, since he was not to be paid a crop rental.1
Lease—Rescission or Repudiation.—Civil Code, Section 1689, provides that contracts may be rescinded only in cases where the consent of the party rescinding is obtained by fraud, duress or undue influence; or failure of consideration through fault of party as to whom the contract is rescinded; or on such consideration becoming entirely void from any cause; or if the consideration, before it is rendered, fails in a material respect; or by consent of all the parties. Section 1691 declares that the rescinding party must restore or offer to- restore the value he has received under the contract. Plaintiff leased certain land to defendant for a certain period, before the expiration of which he told defendant he might have it for another like period, and subsequently acknowledged to plaintiff that he told him he might have the land, but that his word was worthless, and that he could not have it. Held, that this did not amount to a rescission of the contract, but was a mere repudiation.
Unlawful Detainer.—Where, in an Action for Unlawful detainer of land, defendant answers that he holds over under an oral agreement by which he was to do certain work as part consideration for extension of the lease, the value of which was to be applied to the second year’s rental, there is no prejudicial error in overruling an objection to the question, “Have you been paid for this work!” asked of defendant by his counsel, though it is not within any issue.
Unlawful Detainer.—In an Action for Unlawful Detainer of Land, defendant answered that he held over under an oral agreement entered into before the expiration of the original period, by the terms of which he was to hold for another like period; and he was asked whether he held the premises at that time under the original lease or the subsequent agreement. Held, that, though the question asked for a conclusion rather than a fact, error in admitting it was harmless, since it was evident that defendant claimed to hold under the verbal agreement.
CHIPMAN, C. Action to recover possession of real property demised by plaintiff to defendant, the léase having expired, and defendant continuing in possession. The cause was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment given in favor'of defendant, from which, and from the order denying his motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals.
The complaint sets forth a written lease for one year from November 5, 1896, at a certain cash rental; that on November 6, 1897, plaintiff made demand in waiting for possession; that more than three days have elapsed since making demand, and defendant has refused and neglected to quit possession. The complaint was filed November 24, 1897, and states the action of unlawful detainer, under section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The answer alleges that about March 15, 1897, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement by the terms of which plaintiff leased the premises to defendant for an additional year, to begin at the expiration of the term for which defendant then held the premises, and on the same terms; and that plaintiff further agreed at the same time to employ defendant to do certain described farm work for him, and apply the compensation therefor on the rental for said additional year. The cause was tried on February 28, 1898, and the court found the written lease as alleged in the complaint; that defendant went into possession thereunder, and is now in possession under the verbal lease as alleged in the answer; and as conclusion of law the court found that defendant was entitled to judgment for his costs, and that [557]plaintiff take nothing by his action. The principal fact at issue was the alleged verbal lease found by the court to have been entered into between the parties. It is urged that the evidence does not support the finding. The evidence is sharply conflicting, and we can only inquire whether there was evidence sufficient to support the finding. Defendant testified that, owing to the continued wet weather, and the consequent improbability of his being able to put a crop in the land for the year 1896-97, he had a conversation with plaintiff in January, 1897, at which time plaintiff told defendant that he could have the land another year; “that he would continue the present lease, and he would give me his work in cutting his own crop on the home place to help pay the rent. I accepted that proposition.....In consequence of that conversation, I made further efforts to put in more land. I put in some, but that is wet land, and in order to dry it I ran ditches through it to run the water off so I could summer-fallow it. ’ ’ Again, he testified that in February or first of March “we had another conversation [in the presence of two persons, whom he named].....It was just beginning to rain, and we spoke about the weather; that it was hard to get a crop in on that piece of ground, and that it was late; it was low, wet ground, and he said I could summer-fallow the ground, and that he would not go back on his word; that I could have the place another year, and that he would give me all the work he had to pay the rent. I told him I would take the place.” Defendant testified further that in March following he looked over plaintiff’s hay ground, and a price for the work was agreed on, and plaintiff asked defendant “if it would go on the rent, as we had agreed,” to which defendant replied, “I told him ‘Yes.’ ” Again, in July defendant met plaintiff, and the latter “began finding fault with the way the work was done. I asked him if he didn’t say it was satisfactory at the time it was done. He said that he did, but that he had found fault with it. I said, ‘Didn’t you agree to let me have it?’ He said ‘Yes.’ I said, ‘Ain’t your word worth anything ? ’ He said, ‘No, it’s not worth a damn, and you can’t have it.’ That was all the conversation at that time. ’ ’ There is considerable testimony corroborative of plaintiff’s having agreed to extend the lease one year. It is true that the testimony of plaintiff and that of his wife is directly the other way, and would perhaps have justified
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