Leszynsky v. Meyer
Before: Britt
Synopsis
Brokers—Compensation for Sale of Realty—Insufficient Evidence.—On January 17, 1891, plaintiff, at London, transmitted to decedent an offer from a corporation there to purchase certain land owned by him which he accepted on conditions, one of which was that £10,000 be advanced as security for performance. On April 25th plaintiff wrote, asking that the conditions be waived. No direct response was made, and decedent, on June 2d, wrote that, unless he received notice by July 1st that the matter was closed, he would withdraw about one-half of the land from the pending proposals. No such notice was sent, but plaintiff wrote that the letter was not clear, and that he expected to hear from decedent that the proposition was satisfactory. On December 5th plaintiff wrote that the corporation would be glad to do business, and requested decedent to send someone to .London to complete the negotiations as outlined in their former propositions, which letter was delivered by R. On January 15, 1892, decedent replied that he was sorry his last letter was not sufficiently clear, and that he was willing to sell on the terms proposed in their letter of January 17, 1891, or would divide the property into two portions, and, if the matter was definitely settled, his son in law could go to London, provided £1,000 was paid for his expenses. On March 16th plaintiff wrote that the corporation was in liquidation, and he would try to sell the land to others. B. testified that when he delivered the letter of December 5, 1891, decedent said he knew satisfactory terms had been made between himself and the corporation about June or July, 1891, and that plaintiff had effected a sale with these parties, and that he should have gone across, and closed up the matter on the other side. Held, in an action to recover for services rendered in procuring the purchaser for the land, that there never was such a meeting of the minds of the negotiating parties as would authorize reeovery.1
BRITT, C. According to (the view taken by plaintiff (which for present purposes we may concede to be correct), the cause of action on which he rested his case at the trial is to be regarded as founded on the asserted liability of Joseph P. Hale for services rendered by plaintiff in procuring a purchaser for a great tract of land owned or controlled by Hale, and situated in Lower California; the reasonable value of such services being stated at the sum of $160,000. On the evidence for plaintiff the court below rendered judgment of nonsuit against him. The greater part of the evidence consisted of a series of letters passed between plaintiff at London, England, and Hale at San Francisco, California. It will be sufficient to state the effect of only a few of these. Hale died before this action was begun. On January 17, 1891, plaintiff procured and transmitted to Hale an offer in writing from a con[55]cern styled usually in the correspondence the London and Amsterdam Trust Company. Such offer was a proposal to form a corporation to “take over, work, and develop the property,” and to pay Hale therefor £400,000 as follows: Cash, £100,000; six per cent first mortgage debentures, £100,000; shares in such proposed corporation, £200,000. Hale replied that he would accept the offer on conditions, one of which was that said trust company should advance £10,000 cash as security for performance. April 25, 1891, plaintiff wrote to Hale, asking that he waive this condition. Hale made no direct response, but on June 2, 1891, he wrote to plaintiff saying that unless he received notice by July 1st that the matter was closed, he would withdraw about one-half of the tract from the pending proposals. No such notice was sent, but plaintiff claims that Hale’s letter of June 2d was intended as an acceptance of the original offer of said trust company. The following is the more material evidence in which plaintiff sees color for this contention: July 10, 1891, plaintiff wrote to Hale that the letter of June 2d was not clear, and saying that he expected to hear from him fully that the proposition of said trust company was satisfactory. Hale made no reply to this. On December 5, 1891, the plaintiff wrote to Hale that the London and Amsterdam Trust Company “would be glad to do the business with your Lower California lands.....To carry out their program it would be necessary to send over here power of attorney either to your son in law, the Honorable Mr. Boyle, or anybody else you please, to sell your land on the terms and price outlined in their former propositions”; which letter was delivered to Hale in San Francisco by one A. J. Rich. January 15, 1892, Hale replied: “I regret that ■my last letter should not have seemed sufficiently clear to you, and will endeavor to be more explicit in this one. I am willing to sell the whole of my property in Lower California .... to the London and Amsterdam Trust Company on the terms they proposed in their letter dated 17th January of last year, .... or I am prepared to divide my lands into two portions, and dispose of them separately [stating terms at length].....My son in law, the Honorable R. Boyle, is with me here, and, if the matter were definitely settled, he would, if necessary, go over to London to see the directors. In the event of his being sent, I should, of course, expect a sum, say £1,000, ■to be paid to my bankers in London for his expenses, which
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