Colfax Mountain Fruit Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.
Before: Britt
Synopsis
Connecting Carrier—Limitation of Liability.—Under Civil Code, section 2201, declaring that the liability of a carrier who accepts freight for a place 'beyond his route ceases on delivery to a connecting line, “unless he stipulates otherwise,” a provision in a, freight contract that the carrier’s responsibility shall cease at the connecting point is not rendered ineffective by a further stipulation for through passenger train service.1
Connecting Carriers—Limitation of Liability.—There being no repugnancy between the provision limiting the carrier’s liability to its own line and the stipulation for through passenger train service, the fact that the first is printed, while the last is in writing, is immaterial in construing the contract.
Connecting Carriers—Limitation of Liability.—Where a railroad company receives freight for shipment under an agreement to forward it to its destination, and the stipulation that its liability as carrier shall cease on delivery of the goods to the first connecting line, the contract also providing for “passenger service through,” the duty of the company as forwarding agent continues till the goods arrive at their ultimate destination, and it is therefore liable for any delay caused by its failure to notify each successive connecting road of the conditions of the contract in respect to the manner of transportations.2
Connecting Carriers—Damages for Delay.—In an Action by the Shipper against the contracting carrier for damages caused by such delay, the burden is on defendant to show that it notified each successive connecting road of the conditions regarding the manner of transportation, or, if it did not, that the delay was not attributable to its default in this respect.
BRITT, C. At the trial of this case the parties agreed on the facts by written stipulation which was adopted by the court as its findings. It thus appears that on October 24, 1890, defendant was a common carrier operating a line of railroad between Colfax, in Placer county, and Ogden, Utah, the latter point being the terminus of its route in the direction of the city of New York. On that day defendant received from plaintiff at Colfax a carload of fruit for transportation according to the terms of a written contract called a “shipping order” signed by plaintiff, describing the goods to be carried, stating that the same were to be forwarded to Ogden station and there delivered, and containing also the following matter: “Consignee, marks, and destination: Sgobel & Day, New York.....Care C. & N. W., via Erie Dispatch, New York. Passenger train service, U. P. 32009. Agent Southern Pacific Company will please forward subject to conditions and agreements indorsed hereon.” One of such conditions was that: “The company agrees to forward the property to the place of destination named, but its responsibility as a common carrier is to cease at the station where the freight leaves this road, when the property is to be delivered to connecting roads or carriers.” It seems that the characters “U. P. 32009” meant “Union Pacific car No. 32,009.” Concurrently with the execution by plaintiff of such shipping order, the defendant gave to .plaintiff a “shipping receipt,” which differed from the order mainly, for present purposes, in that it contained the words “passenger service through,” instead of “passenger train ser[529]vice,” as in the order. At this time there was a traffic agreement in force between defendant and several other carriers, whose routes, by successively connecting, formed a through line, viz., the Union Pacific Railway Company, the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, and the Brie Dispatch Company, and pursuant to such traffic agreement said car of fruit was carried to New York. There the Brie Dispatch Company delivered it to the consignees, and collected of them the whole amount of freight charges for the haul from Colfax, which amount was divided in gross among the several connecting carriers for the carriage by them respectively furnished to the goods in accordance with their said arrangement. Defendant transported the car in question, by passenger train, over its road to Ogden, and there delivered it to the Union Pacific Railway Company, the next connecting carrier, with request that the last-named company ‘‘and its connection between Ogden and New York City should, until the arrival of said car at final destination, accord to it passenger train service.” After such delivery to the Union Pacific Company—but on what line does not appear—delay occurred in the transmission of the car, so that it was three days overdue on arrival at New York, and in consequence the fruit suffered decay, and was sold at a loss to plaintiff. For the amount of such loss the court below held defendant liable, and rendered judgment in plaintiff’s favor.
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